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Résumé: Cet article analyse l'équilibre d'un marché d'assurances où les individus qui souscrivent une 
police d'assurance ont une obligation de bonne foi lorsqu'ils révèlent une information privée 
sur leur risque. Les assureurs peuvent, à un certain coût, vérifier le type des assurés qui 
présentent une demande d'indemnité et ils sont autorisés à annuler rétroactivement le contrat 
d'assurance s'il est établi que l'assuré avait présenté son risque de manière incorrecte lorsqu'il 
avait souscrit la police d'assurance. Toutefois les assureurs ne peuvent s'engager sur leur 
stratégie de vérification du risque. L'article analyse la relation entre l'optimalité de Pareto de 
second rang et l'équilibre concurrentiel du marché de l'assurance dans un cadre de théorie des 
jeux. Il caractérise les contrats offerts à l'équilibre, les choix de contrat par les individus ainsi 
que les conditions d'existence de l'équilibre. 
 
Abstract: This paper analyzes the equilibrium of an insurance market where applicants for insurance 
have a duty of good faith when they reveal private information about their risk type. Insurers 
can, at some cost, verify the type of insureds who file a claim and they are allowed to 
retroactively void the insurance contract if it is established that the policyholder has 
misrepresented his risk when the contract was taken out. However, insurers cannot precommit 
to their risk verification strategy. The paper analyzes the relationship between second-best 
Pareto-optimality and the insurance market equilibrium in a game theoretic framework. It 
characterizes the contracts offered at equilibrium, the individuals' contract choice as well as 
the conditions under which an equilibrium exists. 
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1 Introduction
Under the law of contracts, an insurer is bound by the provisions of an insurance policy
insofar as the policyholder has not deliberately concealed relevant information about
his risks when the insurance was taken out. The contract is automatically rescinded in
case of risk misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material facts affecting risk unless the
policyholder’s good faith is established1.
Dixit (2000) studies the consequences of the duty of good faith in the setting of a
competitive insurance market a` la Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976). He shows that the good
faith principle achieves a Pareto improvement by allowing the insurers to better separate
low risk individuals from high risks ones. If verifying the accident probability is not too
costly, then a random ex post investigation should be carried out when an alleged low
risk individual files a claim, no indemnity being paid to a policyholder caught lying.
Dixit also shows that a larger insurance indemnity should be paid to a (truthful) low
risk individual in case of verification than when the claim is not verified. Furthermore,
the good faith principle extends the range of high risk and low risk proportions for
which a competitive equilibrium exists. Dixit and Picard (2003) extend Dixit’s results
to a setting where individuals may have only partial information about their risk level
: they only perceive a signal of their risk. Bad faith and good faith then respectively
correspond to intentional or unintentional misrepresentation of risk and insurers can
verify risk type, perceived signal or both.
In these papers, insurers commit to a random investigation policy and all policy-
holders reveal their information truthfully at equilibrium : in other words, they are all
in good faith. Consequently, when verification is costly, insurers may be tempted not
to verify the policyholders’ types or perceived signals with the preannounced frequency,
which implies that the insurers’ verification strategy is weakened by credibility problems.
The present paper will focus attention on this issue of the credibility of the insurers’
verification strategy when insurance applicants have a duty of good faith.
It is hardly likely that full commitment on a verification strategy can be recovered
thanks to repeated relationships. Firstly, the duration of an insurer-policyholder rela-
tionship is finite and random. In particular, an increase in the customers’ turnover (i.e.
a larger probability to quit at each period of time) is equivalent to an increase in the
discount rate : a large turnover rate will prevent the insurer to reach a full commitment.
Secondly, for a given policyholder the frequency of an accident is usually too low for
commitment to be sustainable in a long run relationship. This is all the more likely
because the optimal verification strategy is probabilistic which makes the detection of
deviations even more difficult. Thirdly, a policyholder usually has imperfect informa-
1See Clarke (1997) on the duty of good faith in the law of insurance contracts. Colquitt and Hoyt
(1997) show that most of the reasons provided by US life insurers for resisting claims are linked to the
bad faith of insured, mainly material risk misrepresentation, hidden preexisting condition, misstatement
of age or of medical history.
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tion about the verification frequency of other policyholders which reduces the insurers’
ability to build a reputation for frequent auditing.
In this paper, to make the problem more easily tractable, but also to look at the
good faith principle from the a priori less favorable point of view, we will consider a
one-shot insurer-policyholder relationship in which any commitment through repeated
relationship is dismissed. The setting is similar to the model of Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976). There is a large number of risk averse individuals who have private information
on their accident probability : there are low risk individuals and high risk individuals.
These individuals seek for insurance on a competitive market. Each insurer offers a
menu of two contracts, one of them being reserved for low risk individuals. Individuals
choose the contract they prefer. A high risk individuals may lie: he may announce that
he is a low risk in order to benefit from cheaper insurance. Insurers may carry out a
costly verification of the risk type of alleged low risk individuals who file a claim. If
investigation reveals that the individual was not truthful, then the good faith principle
allows the insurer to canceal the contract and to deny any indemnity. The remaining
player is nature : it chooses the risk type of each individual and whether he has an
accident or not. Insurers, individuals and nature play a multistage game whose (perfect
Bayesian) equilibrium is the insurance market equilibrium. In particular, at equilibrium
the insurer’s verification probability is the best response to the policyholder’s contract
choice strategy.
Our first stage will be to characterize the second-best Pareto optimal allocations,
i.e. the allocations that are efficient under the additional constraints imposed by the
asymmetry of information between insureds and insurers and by the unability of insurers
to commit on their auditing strategy. This will be an important step toward the char-
acterization of the market equilibrium because, in the present model, the equilibrium
allocation (i.e. the players’ decisions on the equilibrium path of the insurance market
game) are second-best Pareto optimal2. It will be shown that second-best Pareto optimal
allocations, and in particular equilibrium allocations, are symmetric, in the sense that
generically all insurers offer the same menu of contract. Furthermore, at equilibrium
there is no cross-subsidization between contracts. These results will require refinements
of the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium concept (trembling-hand perfection and a Markov-
type restriction on the low risk individual strategy), but from the point of view of realism
we really think that these are innocuous restrictions and that they do not really affect the
relevance of the results. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, we will show through
examples that the correspondance between second-best Pareto-optimal allocations and
equilibrium allocations vanishes when the refinements are not postulated.
2Readers who are familiar with the Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) model may be surprised at such a
statement because, in the basic version of the Rothschild-Stiglitz model, the equilibrium allocation is
not necessarily second-best Pareto-optimal. Indeed in this version, each insurer only offers one contract
and at equilibrium insurers specialize in high risk or low risk customers. When each insurer can offer a
menu, as in the present model, then the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium is second-best Pareto optimal.
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From a methodological standpoint, our model shows that the characterization of
second-best Pareto optimal allocations is a fruitful roundabout means to analyze the
competitive market equilibrium. Hopefully this is a result of general interest for other
markets with adverse selection where players (e.g. lenders and borrowers, employers
and employees,...) interact after the initial contract offer by the uninformed parties.
Concerning the analysis of the insurance market itself (under the refined equilibrium
concept), our main results are the following. Firstly, the good faith principle is still
Pareto-improving in this no-commitment setting. Secondly, an equilibrium exists for a
larger set of parameters than in the standard Rothschild-Stiglitz model. Thirdly, the
equilibrium may be separating or semi-separating. At a separating equilibrium, differ-
ent types purchase different contracts : there is full coverage for high risks and partial
coverage for low risks and no auditing is implemented at equilibrium. A separating equi-
librium in fact coincides with the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium: high-risk individuals
are indifferent between buying full insurance at fair premium and choosing the insurance
contract which is intended for low-risks individuals. By contrast, at a semi-separating
equilibrium, high-risks randomize between both contracts ( we may say that they are in
bad faith with positive probability) and the risk type is verified with positive probability
for alleged low risk individuals who have filed a claim. Furthermore, a separating equi-
librium involves partial coverage for low risks individuals (as in the Rothschild-Stiglitz
model) but they are overinsured at a semi-separating equilibrium. Fourthly, we shall
define the conditions of validity of the different regimes that may prevail (separating
equilibrium, semi-separating equilibrium or no equilibrium) according to the values of
two parameters : the fraction of high risk individuals in the population and the cost of
risk type verification.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 introduces
the definition and the basic properties of an insurance market equilibrium with risk
verification. Section 4 characterizes second-best Pareto-optimal allocations. Section
5 provides our results about the existence and the features of a market equilibrium.
Section 6 concludes. The proofs are gathered in the appendix.
2 The model
We consider a large population represented by a continuum of individuals facing id-
iosyncratic risks of accident. All individuals are risk averse : they maximize the ex-
pected utility of wealth u(W ), where W denotes wealth and the (twice continuously
differentiable) utility function u is such that u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0. If no insurance policy
is taken out, we have W = WN in the no-accident state and W = WA in the accident
state; A = WN −WA is the loss from an accident. Individuals differ according to their
probability of accident pi and they have private information on their own accident prob-
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ability. We have pi = pi` for a low-risk individual (or `-type) and pi = pih for a high-risk
individual (or h-type) with 0 < pi` < pih < 1. The fraction of high-risk individuals is λ
with 0 < λ < 1 and pi = λpih + (1− λ)pi` is the average probability of loss.
Insurance contracts are offered by n insurers (n ≥ 2) indexed by i = 1, ..., n and
we assume that each individual can buy only one contract. An insurance contract is
written as (k, x) where k is the insurance premium and x is the net payout in case of an
accident. Hence x + k is the indemnity. The expected utility of a policyholder is then
written as
Eu = (1− pi)u(WN − k) + piu(WA + x), (1)
where pi ∈ {pi`, pih}. C∗` = (k∗` , x∗`) = (pi`A,A−pi`A) and C∗h = (k∗h, x∗h) = (pihA,A−pihA)
are the actuarially fair full insurance contracts, respectively for low risk and high risk.
Let us begin with a brief presentation of the Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) model. An
equilibrium in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz consists of a set of contracts such
that, when individuals choose contracts to maximize expected utility, (i): Each contract
in the equilibrium set makes non-negative expected profit, and (ii): There is no contract
outside the equilibrium set that, if offered in addition to those in the equilibrium set,
would make strictly positive expected profits. This concept of equilibrium may be
understood as a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of a game where insurers
simultaneously offer contracts and individuals respond by choosing one of the contracts
(or refusing them all). At equilibrium, each contract makes zero profit and there is no
profitable deviation at the contract offering stage, given the subsequent reaction of the
insurance purchasers.
Rothschild and Stiglitz show that there cannot be a pooling equilibrium where both
groups would buy the same contract. Only a separating equilibrium can exist : dif-
ferent types then choose different contracts. Rothschild and Stiglitz establish that the
only candidate separating equilibrium is such that high risk individuals purchase full
insurance at fair price, i.e. they choose C∗h, and low risk individuals purchase a con-
tract C∗∗` with partial coverage. C
∗∗
` is the contract that low risk individuals most
prefer in the set of (fairly priced) contracts that do not attract high risk individuals:
C∗∗` = (k
∗∗
` , x
∗∗
` ) = (pi`A
′, A′ − pi`A′) with A′ ∈ (0, A) given by
u(WN − pihA) = (1− pih)u(WN − pi`A′) + pihu(WA + (1− pi`)A′). (2)
The Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1, with state-dependent
wealth on each axis3. W 1 = WN − k and W 2 = WA + x respectively denote final
wealth in the no-accident state and in the accident state. The no-insurance situation
corresponds to point E with coordinates W 1 = WN and W 2 = WA. The high risk and
low risk fair-odds line go through E, with slopes (in absolute value) respectively equal to
3Because no ambiguity may occur, we use the same notation for insurance contracts (k, x) and their
images in the (W 1,W 2) plane.
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pih/1− pih and pi`/1− pi`. At C∗h the h-type indifference curve is tangent to the high risk
fair-odds line EH. Similarly, C∗` is at a tangency point between a `-type indifference
curve and the low risk fair-odds line EL. C∗∗` is at the intersection between EL and the
high-risk indifference curve that goes through C∗h. EA in Figure 1 corresponds to the
average fair-odds line with slope pi/1− pi.
Figure 1
Rothschild and Stiglitz also show that the candidate equilibrium C∗h, C
∗∗
` is actually
an equilibrium (in the sense of the above definition) if and only if λ is larger than a
threshold λ̂, with λ̂ ∈ (0, 1). When λ = λ̂, the low-risk indifference curve that goes
through C∗∗` is just tangent to EA. When λ < λ̂, there exist contracts that, if offered in
addition to C∗h, C
∗∗
` , would attract high and low-risk individuals and that would make
a positive expected profit. Hence, an equilibrium in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz
only exists if λ ≥ λ̂ as represented in Figure 1.
The above given definition of an equilibrium assumes that each insurer can only offer
one contract. At equilibrium some insurers offer C∗h and others offer C
∗∗
` .When insurers
are allowed to offer a menu of contract, which is certainly a more realistic assumption,
then the definition of an equilibrium in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz consists of a
set of menus that break even on average, such that there is no menu of contracts outside
the equilibrium set that, if offered in addition, would make strictly positive expected
profits. At an equilibrium, the menu C∗h,C
∗∗
` is offered by all insurers: h-types choose C
∗
h
and `-types choose C∗∗` . Hence the set of equilibrium contracts is unchanged. However,
the possibility of offering a menu increases the critical proportion of high risk individuals
above which an equilibrium exist: there exists λ∗ in (0, 1), with λ∗ > λ̂ such that an
equilibrium exists if and only if λ ≥ λ∗4.
In what follows, we will modify the Rothschild-Stiglitz model by considering the
consequences of the good faith principle. Applicants for insurance have a duty of good
faith, which stipulates that they should reveal their risk type truthfully and provides
that if an investigation reveals that a high risk individual passed himself off as a low
risk, then the insurance contract may be rescinded. It will be assumed that no third
party can verify whether a risk type investigation has actually been carried out, except
when risk misrepresentation has been established. In other words, only the proof of
risk misrepresentation is verifiable information. Under this assumption, a supposedly
low-risk policyholder receives the same insurance indemnity when the truthfulness of his
assertion has been verified by the insurer and when no investigation has been carried
out5. In such a framework, an insurance contract is still written as (k, x) where k is the
insurance premium and x is the net payout in case of an accident, and the expected
4The fact that λ∗ is larger than bλ was pointed out by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) themselves.
5This restriction on the set of admissible contracts is in line with the common practice of insurers.
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utility of a truthful policyholder is given by (1).
At the equilibrium of the insurance market, a contract Ci` = (k
i
`, x
i
`) is offered by
insurer i to low-risk individuals only, while another contract Cih = (k
i
h, x
i
h) offered by
insurer i may be taken out by any individual whatever his type. In case of an accident,
a policyholder who has taken out the Ci` contract will be investigated with probability
pi ∈ [0, 1]. Through investigation, the insurer gets information about the type of the
policyholder. This information is verifiable if the policyholder has misrepresented his
type in which case the insurer voids the contract, which means that no indemnity is
paid and the premium is refunded to the policyholder, and the latter pays a fine F > 0
to the Government6. Verifying the insureds’ type costs c to the insurer. Individuals
may also opt out of purchasing insurance. For notational simplicity, this no-insurance
choice corresponds to an additional (fictitious) insurer i = 0, with C0h = C
0
` ≡ (0, 0) and
p0 ≡ 0.
σihh and σ
i
h` respectively denote the probability for a h-type individual to choose
Cih or C
i
` and σ
i
`h and σ
i
`` respectively denote the probability for a `-type individual
to choose Cih or C
i
`, with
∑n
i=0(σ
i
hh + σ
i
h`) = 1 and
∑n
i=0(σ
i
`h + σ
i
``) = 1. Let C =
(C1h, C
1
` , ..., C
n
h , C
n
` ), p = (p
1, ..., pn), σh = (σ0hh, σ
0
h`, ..., σ
n
hh, σ
n
h`) and σ` = (σ
0
`h, σ
0
``, .., σ
n
`h, σ
n
``).
In what follows, {C, p, σh, σ`} is called an allocation: it is a complete description of the
decisions of firms and individuals in the insurance market.
3 Definition and basic properties of a market equilibrium
An equilibrium of the insurance market is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a five stage
game, called the market game. At stage 1, nature chooses the type of each individual :
he is a h-type with probability λ or a `-type with probability 1−λ. At the second stage,
each insurer i > 0 decides whether to offer a menu of contracts and, if so, she chooses
the specification Cih, C
i
` of each contract in the menu. At the third stage, each individual
decides whether to accept a contract, and if so, which contract in the proposed menus.
At the fourth stage, for each individual, nature decides whether an accident occurs or
not with probability (pih, 1− pih) or (pi`, 1− pi`) according to the individual’s type. The
insured policyholders who have suffered an accident file a claim. At the fifth stage, each
insurer chooses whether or not to verify the type of the alleged low-risk individuals who
have filed a claim (insurer i verifies with probability pi) and, depending on the results
of the investigation, she pays the indemnity or returns the premium.
For any insurance contract (k, x), be it a Ch or a C` contract, the expected utility
of `-type individuals is
U`(k, x) ≡ (1− pi`)u(WN − k) + pi`u(WA + x).
6Assuming F > 0 simplifies matters, but F may be arbitrarily small.
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The expected utility of h-type individuals is
Uh(Cih) ≡ (1− pih)u(WN − kih) + pihu(WA + xih) for Cih,
Uh`(Ci`, p
i) ≡ (1− pih)u(WN − ki`) + pih[(1− pi)u(WA + xih) + piu(WA − F )] for Ci`.
Let Uh ≡ Uh(0, 0), U ` ≡ U`(0, 0), U∗h ≡ Uh(C∗h) = u(WN − pihA) and U∗` ≡ U`(C∗` ) =
u(WN − pi`A). For Cih, insurer i’s expected profit is
Πh(Cih) = (1− pih)kih − pihxih for a h-type policyholder,
Π`(Cih) = (1− pi`)kih − pi`xih for a `-type policyholder.
For a Ci`, the expected profit is
Π`h(Ci`, p
i) = (1− pih)ki` − pih[(1− pi)xi` + pic] for a h-type policyholder,
Π``(Ci`, p
i) = (1− pi`)ki` − pi`(xi` + pic) for a `-type policyholder.
Let us now define the players’ strategies and beliefs in the market game. The strategy
of insurer i > 0 is defined by Ci ∈ R4+ and pi(.) : R4n+ → [0, 1] where Ci = (Cih, Ci`) and
pi(C) is the audit probability for Ci` at stage 5 when C = (C
1, ..., Cn) is offered in the
market at stage 2. Let p(.) = (p1(.), ..., pn(.)) be the profile of auditing strategy and
p0(.) ≡ 0.
The strategy of h-type individuals is σh(.) : R4n+ → S2n+1 where σh(C) = (σ0hh(C), σ0h`(C),
..., σnhh(C), σ
n
h`(C)) describes the h-types’ contract choices when C is offered and S
2n+1 =
{t = (t1, t2, ...t2n+2) ∈ R2n+2+ ,
∑2n+2
j=1 tj = 1} is the 2n+1 dimensional simplex. In words,
a h-type individual chooses Cih with probability σ
i
hh(C) and he chooses C
i
` with proba-
bility σih`(C) when C is offered. Likewise, the strategy of `-types is σ`(.) : R4n+ → S2n+1
where σ`(C) = (σ0`h(C), σ
0
``(C), ..., σ
n
`h(C), σ
n
``(C)) specifies the contract choices by `-
type individuals. Hence the profile of strategy is denoted by {C, p(.), σh(.), σ`(.)}.
Auditing decisions depend on the insurers’beliefs about the policyholders’ type. Be-
liefs depend on the set of contracts that are offered in the market. At stage 5, the beliefs
of insurer i > 0 are defined by by µi(.) : R4n+ → [0, 1] where µi(C) is the probability that
a Ci`-claimant is a h-type when C is offered at stage 2. The system of beliefs is denoted
by µ(.) = (µ1(.), ..., µn(.)). We have assumed that insurers refund premium but do not
pay anything else if investigation reveals that an alleged `-type individual was in fact a
h-type. Thus, given the beliefs µi(C) and the audit probability pi, the expected cost of
a claim filed by a Ci`-policyholder is x
i
` + p
i[c− µi(C)xi`].
Definition 1. A profile of strategies C˜, p˜(.), σ˜h(.), σ˜`(.) and system of beliefs µ˜(.) is a
8
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the market game if it has the following properties:
n∑
i=0
[σ˜ihh(C)Uh(C
i
h) + σ˜
i
h`(C)Uh`(C
i
`, p˜
i(C))] ≥
n∑
i=0
[σihhUh(C
i
h) + σ
i
h`Uh`(C
i
`, p˜
i(C))]
for all σh ∈ S2n+1 and all C ∈ R4n+ , (3)
n∑
i=0
[σ˜i`h(C)U`(C
i
h) + σ˜
i
``(C)U`(C
i
`)] ≥
n∑
i=0
[σi`hU`(C
i
h) + σ
i
``U`(C
i
`)]
for all σ` ∈ S2n+1 and all C ∈ R4n+ , (4)
p˜i(C)[µ˜i(C)xi` − c] ≥ pi[µ˜i(C)xi` − c]
for all pi ∈ [0, 1], all C ∈ R4n+ and all i = 1, ..., n, (5)
λ[σ˜ihh(C˜)Πh(C˜
i
h) + σ˜
i
h`(C˜)Π`h(C˜
i
`, p˜
i(C˜))]
+(1− λ)[σ˜i`h(C˜)Π`(C˜ih) + σ˜i``(C˜)Π``(C˜i`, p˜i(C˜))]
≥ λ[σ˜ihh(Ci, C˜−i)Πh(Cih) + σ˜ih`(Ci, C˜−i)Π`h(Ci`, p˜i(Ci, C˜−i))]
+(1− λ)[σ˜i`h(Ci, C˜−i)Π`(Cih) + σ˜i``(Ci, C˜−i)Π``(Ci`, p˜i(Ci, C˜−i))
for all Ci = (Cih, C
i
`) ∈ R4+ and all i = 1, ..., n, (6)
µ˜i(C) =
λpihσ˜
i
h`(C)
λpihσ˜
i
h`(C) + (1− λ)pi`σ˜i``(C)
for all C such that σ˜ih`(C) + σ˜
i
``(C) > 0 and all i = 1, ..., n. (7)
(3) means that σ˜h(.) is an optimal contract choice strategy for h-types, given the
profile of insurers’ auditing strategy. (4) says that σ˜`(.) is an optimal contract choice
strategy for `-types. From (5), p˜i(.) is an optimal auditing strategy given insurer i’s
beliefs. Together (3),(4) and (5) mean that for any contract offer C made at stage 2, then
{σ˜h(C), σ˜`(C), p˜(C)} is a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding continuation subgame,
given beliefs µ˜(C). (6) means that C˜i is an optimal offer by insurer i when C˜−i = ( C˜1, ...,
C˜i−1, C˜i+1, ..., C˜n) is offered by the other insurers, given the continuation equilibrium
strategy. In other words, (3)-(6) says that the strategy profile C˜, p˜(.), σ˜h(.), σ˜`(.) is
sequentially rational given the belief system µ˜(.). Finally (7) states that µ˜(.) is derived
from strategy profile σ˜h(.), σ˜`(.) through Bayes law whenever possible. For brevity, in
what follows a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the market game is simply called an
equilibrium (or, more explicitly, an insurance market equilibrium). Lemmas 1 and 2
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establish basic properties of any equilibrium.
Lemma 1. At an equilibrium E = {C˜, p˜(.), σ˜h(.), σ˜`(.), µ˜(.)}, for all C ∈ R4n+ and all i
such that σ˜ih`(C) + σ˜
i
``(C) > 0, we have p˜
i(C) < 1 and
p˜i(C)[µ˜i(C)xi` − c] = 0. (8)
When σ˜ih`(C) = 0 and σ˜
i
``(C) > 0, we have p˜
i(C) = 0.
Lemma 1 first says that auditing is stochastic. Indeed, if p˜i(C) = 1, then h-types do
not choose Ci` and insurer i has no incentive to audit, hence a contradiction. Equation
(8) states that insurer i may audit types with positive probability only if (according
to her beliefs) the proportion of h-types among Ci`-purchasers is equal to a threshold
µ˜i(C) = c/xi`. For such a threshold, the expected benefit of auditing µ˜
i(C)xi` is equal
to the audit cost c. In particular, when Ci` is chosen by `-types only, then the claimants
are not audited.
Lemma 2. At an equilibrium E = {C˜, p˜(.), σ˜h(.), σ˜`(.), µ˜(.)}, we have
λσ˜ih`(C)Π`h(C
i
`, p˜
i(C)) + (1− λ)σ˜i``(C)Π``(Ci`, p˜i(C))
= λσ˜ih`(C)Πh(C
i
`) + (1− λ)σ˜i``(C)Π`(Ci`) for all C ∈ R4n+ and all i = 1, ..., n. (9)
Lemma 2 shows that the expected profit made on any contract Ci` can be written as
a function of the individuals’ strategy σ˜ih`(C) and σ˜
i
``(C) only: the equilibrium auditing
strategy p˜i(C) does not appear explicitly in the right-hand-side of (9).
4 Second-best Pareto-optimal allocations
The next step toward the characterization of an insurance market equilibrium consists
in listing the properties of the equilibrium allocation (i.e. of the strategies played on
the equilibrium path of the game). For an allocation {C, p, σh, σ`}, they are written as
follows:
λpihσ
i
h`x
i
` = c[λpihσ
i
h` + (1− λ)pi`σi``] if pi > 0, i > 0 (10)
λpihσ
i
h`x
i
` ≤ c[λpihσih` + (1− λ)pi`σi``] if pi = 0, i > 0 (11)
λ[σihhΠh(C
i
h) + σ
i
h`Πh(C
i
`)] + (1− λ)[σi`hΠ`(Cih) + σi``Π`(Ci`)] ≥ Πi0 if i > 0, (12)
n∑
i=0
[σihhUh(C
i
h) + σ
i
h`Uh`(C
i
`, p
i)] = max{Uh(Cih), Uh`(Ci`, pi), i = 0, ..., n}, (13)
n∑
i=0
[σi`hU`(C
i
h) + σ
i
``U`(C
i
`)] = max{U`(Cih), U`(Ci`), i = 0, ..., n}, (14)
C ∈ R4n+ , p ∈ [0, 1]n, σh ∈ S2n+1, σ` ∈ S2n+1. (15)
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Any equilibrium {C˜, p˜(.), σ˜h(.), σ˜`(.), µ˜(.)} leads to an equilibrium allocation {C˜, p, σh, σ`}
defined by p = p˜(C˜), σh = σ˜h(C˜), σ` = σ˜`(C˜) which satisfies the conditions (10) to (15)
with Πi0 = 0 for all i > 0. (10) and (11) follow from (5), (7) and Lemma 1: in words,
the expected benefit from auditing is equal to the audit cost when an audit is performed
with positive probability and it is lower than the audit cost otherwise. Lemma 2 shows
that the left-handside in (12) is equal to the equilibrium expected profit of insurer i.
Thus when Πi0 = 0, (12) means that each insurer makes non-negative profit: (6) shows
that this will be actually the case for the equilibrium allocation since deviating to a zero-
contract offer is a possible choice for the insurers. From (13) and (14), all individuals
only choose the best contracts with positive probability.
Definition 2. An allocation {C, p, σh, σ`} is feasible if it satisfies the equations (10)
to (15) with Πi0 = 0 for all i > 0. A feasible allocation {C, p, σh, σ`} is second-best
Pareto-optimal if there is no other feasible allocation {C ′, p′, σ′h, σ′`} such that
n∑
i=0
[σi′hhUh(C
i′
h ) + σ
i′
h`Uh`(C
i′
` , p
i′)] ≥
n∑
i=0
[σihhUh(C
i
h) + σ
i
h`Uh`(C
i
`, p
i)], (16)
n∑
i=0
[σi′`hU`(C
i′
h ) + σ
i′
``U`(C
i′
` )] ≥
n∑
i=0
[σi`hU`(C
i
h) + σ
i
``U`(C
i
`)], (17)
at least one of these inequalities being slack.
In Definition 2, Pareto-optimality is defined in the second-best sense because of in-
formational asymmetries and no-commitment constraints: insurers do not observe the
risk types (hence the self-selection constraints (13) and (14)) and they cannot precom-
mit to their auditing decisions (hence the incentives constraints (10)-(11))7. In order to
characterize second-best Pareto optimal allocations, let us consider the maximization
problem, denoted P1(λ, c, u0,Π10, ...,Πn0 ), in which the `-types expected utility is maxi-
mized over the set of allocations that satify the conditions (10) to (15) and that provide
at least expected utility u0 to h-types, with u0 ≥ Uh. This is written as:
P1(λ, c, u0,Π10, ...,Πn0 ): Maximize
n∑
i=0
[σi`hU`(C
i
h) + σ
i
``U`(C
i
`)],
with respect to C, p, σh, σ` subject to conditions (10) to (15) and
n∑
i=0
[σihhUh(C
i
h) + σ
i
h`Uh`(C
i
`, p
i)] ≥ u0. (18)
Any second-best Pareto-optimal allocation {C, p, σh, σ`} is an optimal solution to P1(λ, c, u0,
0, ..., 0) with u0 =
∑n
i=0[σ
i
hhUh(C
i
h) + σ
i
h`Uh`(C
i
`, p
i)]. We shall see that the h-types’
7See Crocker and Snow (1985) and Henriet and Rochet (1990) on second-best Pareto optimality in
the Rothschild-Stiglitz model.
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expected utility is uniquely defined at the optimum of P1(λ, c, u0, 0, ..., 0). Hence sym-
metrically, any optimal solution to P1(λ, c, u0, 0, ..., 0) is second-best Pareto optimal.
Obviously, any equilibrium allocation {C˜, p, σh, σ`} is a feasible solution to P1(λ, c, U eh,
Π1, ...,Πn) where U eh is the equilibrium expected utility of h-type individuals, i.e. U
e
h =∑n
i=0[σ
i
hhUh(C˜
i
h) + σ
i
h`Uh`(C˜
i
`, p
i)], and Πi is the equilibrium expected profit of insurer
i, i.e
Πi = λ[σihhΠh(C˜
i
h) + σ
i
h`Πh(C˜
i
`)] + (1− λ)[σi`hΠ`(C˜ih) + σi``Π`(C˜i`)].
Let us consider problem P2(λ, c, u0,Π0) obtained from P1(λ, c, u0,Π0, ...,Π0) by assuming
that all individuals actually purchase insurance and by adding a symmetry assumption:
all insurers offer the same contracts and individuals are evenly shared among the insurers:
P2(λ, c, u0,Π0) : Maximize σ̂`hU`(Ch) + σ̂``U`(C`),
with respect to Ch = (kh, xh), C` = (k`, x`), p̂, , σ̂hh, σ̂h`, σ̂`h, σ̂`` subject to
λ[σ̂hhΠh(Ch) + σ̂h`Πh(C`)] + (1− λ)[σ̂`hΠ`(Ch) + σ̂``Π`(C`)] ≥ Π0, (19)
λpihσ̂h`x` = c[λpihσ̂h` + (1− λ)pi`σ̂``] if p̂ > 0, (20)
λpihσ̂h`x` ≤ c[λpihσ̂h` + (1− λ)pi`σ̂``] if p̂ = 0, (21)
σ̂hhUh(Ch) + σ̂h`Uh`(C`, p̂) = max{Uh(Ch), Uh`(C`, p̂)}, (22)
σ̂`hU`(Ch) + σ̂``U`(C`) = max{U`(Ch), U`(C`)}, (23)
σ̂hhUh(Ch) + σ̂h`Uh`(C`, p̂) ≥ u0, (24)
(Ch, C`) ∈ R4+, p̂ ∈ [0, 1], (σ̂hh, σ̂h`) ∈ S1, (σ̂`h, σ̂``) ∈ S1. (25)
In P2(λ, c, u0,Π0), there are only two contracts : Ch and C`. p̂ is the audit probability
for C`, σ̂hh is the probability for h-types to choose Ch, σ̂h` is the probability for h-types
to choose C`, etc... Π0 is the required profit per insured. Let Φ2(λ, c, U0,Π0) be the
value function of P2(λ, c, u0,Π0)8.
Let us first consider P2(λ, c, u0,Π0) under the additional constraint p̂ = 0 or σ̂`` =
σ̂h` = 0 which means that either there is no auditing or nobody chooses C` (so that p̂ is
irrelevant). The corresponding maximization problem and value function are respectively
denoted P3(λ, c, u0,Π0) and Φ3(λ, c, u0,Π0). They are characterized in Proposition 1
and Corollary 1. We respectively denote C0 ≡ (piA + Π0, (1 − pi)A − Π0) and u0 ≡
u(WN − piA− Π0) the full insurance pooling contract that provides expected profit Π0
and the corresponding utility. Let also U0h = u(WN − pihA − Π0). U0h is the highest
expected utility that h-types may reach through a (full coverage) insurance contract
that provides profit at least equal to Π0, with U0h = U
∗
h if Π0 = 0.
8We will later show that problem P2(λ, c, u0,Π0) has an optimal solution when the set of its feasible
solutions is non empty (i.e. when u0 is not too large). For the time being, Φ2(λ, c, u0,Π0) is defined as the
smallest upper bound of `-types expected utility among the allocations that are feasible in P2(λ, c, u0,Π0)
with Φ2(λ, c, u0,Π0) = −∞ if there is no feasible solution. The same for Φ3 and Φ4 below.
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Proposition 1. (i) There is a unique optimal solution to P3(λ, c, u0,Π0) and it is such
that p̂ = 0, σ̂hh = σ̂`` = 1, σ̂h` = σ̂`h = 0 and (Ch, C`) ∈ R4+ maximize U`(C`) subject to9
λΠh(Ch) + (1− λ)Π`(C`) ≥ Π0, (26)
U`(C`) ≥ U`(Ch), (27)
Uh(Ch) ≥ Uh(C`), (28)
Uh(Ch) ≥ u0. (29)
(ii) At this optimal solution Ch = C` = C0 if u0 = u0 and Ch 6= C` if u0 6= u0 with:
If u0 < u0 : xh + kh = A, k` + x` < A,Uh(C`) = Uh(Ch) < u0, U`(C`) > u0 > U`(Ch),
If u0 > u0 : xh + kh > A, k` + x` = A,Uh(C`) > Uh(Ch) = u0, U`(C`) = U`(Ch) < u0.
(iii) For all η > 0, there exist ε, ε′ > 0 and (Ch, C`) ∈ R4+, p̂ = 0, σ̂hh = σ̂`` =
1, σ̂h` = σ̂`h = 0 feasible in P3(λ, c, u0+ ε,Π0+ ε′) such that U`(C`) > U`(Ch), Uh(Ch) >
Uh(C`), Uh(Ch) ≥ u0 + ε and U`(C`) ≥ Φ3(λ, c, u0,Π0)− η.
Proposition 1-i states that individuals do not randomize at a second-best Pareto-
optimal allocation without auditing: Ch is chosen by h-types and C` by `-types. Propo-
sition 1-ii coincides with the results by Crocker and Snow (1985)10. When u0 < u0,
h-types are fully insured and `-types have partial insurance, while the h-types self-
selection constraint (28) is binding and the `-types constraint (27) is slack. The results
are reversed when u0 > u0: then there is overinsurance for h-types and full insurance
for `-types, while (27) is binding and (28) is slack. A pooling allocation is optimal only
when u0 = u0. Proposition 1-iii states that if the `-type expected utility is lower than
Φ3(λ, c, u0,Π0) and h-types reach expected utility u0, then it is possible to improve the
welfare of everybody while increasing profit through a pair of strictly incentive compat-
ible contracts.
Corollary 1. There exists λ∗ in (0, 1) such that Φ3(λ, c, U∗h , 0) > U`(C
∗∗
` ) if 0 ≤ λ < λ∗
and Φ3(λ, c, U∗h , 0) = U`(C
∗∗
` ) if λ
∗ ≤ λ ≤ 1.
From Corollary 1, when λ < λ∗ there exists a menu of contracts with cross-subsidization
that Pareto-dominates th Rothschild-Stiglitz alloction. As already mentioned, in such
a case there is no equilibrium in the Rothschild-Stiglitz model.
9Of course, by symmetry, there also exists an optimal solution to P3(λ, u0,Π0) where `-types choose
Ch and h-types choose C`. The fact that `-types chooses C` and h-types choose Ch is purely a notational
convention since there is no auditing. It is the characterization of the contract chosen by each type that
matters.
10The characterization of Crocker and Snow (1985) can be directly recovered from the Proposition
since u0 = u(W − piA) when Π0 = 0. They implicitly postulate that individuals do not randomize
between contracts at a second-best Pareto-optimal allocation: Proposition 1-i establishes that this is
actually the case.
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Now let us consider problem P2(λ, c, u0,Π0) under the additional constraints p̂ > 0
and {σ̂`` > 0 or σ̂h` > 0}. This will be called problem P4(λ, c, u0,Π0), with value function
Φ4(λ, c, u0,Π0). Note that (20) implies σ̂h` > 0 when σ̂`` > 0. Hence, any allocation
feasible in P4(λ, c, u0,Π0) is such that σ̂h` > 0, which implies Uh`(C`, p̂) ≥ u0 for such an
allocation. σ̂h` > 0 and p̂ > 0 then give Ch 6= C`. We also have Uh(C`) = Uh`(C`, 0) >
Uh`(C`, p̂) ≥ Uh(Ch): hence h-types strongly prefer C` to Ch.
The domain of P4(λ, c, u0,Π0) is not a closed set and consequently this problem may
not have any optimal solution. However, we are in fact interested in P4(λ, c, u0,Π0) only
when Φ4(λ, c, u0,Π0) ≥ Φ3(λ, c, u0,Π0) and, among other results, Proposition 2 shows
that, under this restriction, P4(λ, c, u0,Π0) has actually an optimal solution.
Proposition 2. If Φ4(λ, c, u0,Π0) ≥ Φ3(λ, c, u0,Π0) then:
(i) u0 < u0,
(ii) There is an optimal solution to P4(λ, c, u0,Π0). It is such that: σ̂`` = 1, 0 <
σ̂h` < 1 and Ch, C`, σ̂h` maximize U`(C`) subject to :
λΠh(Ch)(1− σ̂h`) + λσ̂h`Πh(C`) + (1− λ)Π`(C`) ≥ Π0, (30)
σ̂h` = K(x`, λ, c) ≡ (1− λ)cpi`
λpih(x` − c) ≤ 1, (31)
U`(C`) ≥ U`(Ch), (32)
Uh(C`) > Uh(Ch), (33)
Uh(Ch) ≥ u0. (34)
(iii) For this optimal solution, we have Uh(Ch) = Uh`(C`, p̂) = u0 < u0 < U`(C`)
and kh + xh = A. Furthermore when u0 = U∗h and Π0 = 0, we have Ch = C
∗
h and
k` + x` > A.
(iv) For all η > 0, there exist ε, ε′ > 0 and (Ch, C`) ∈ R4+ p̂ > 0, σ̂`` = 1, σ̂h` ∈ (0, 1]
feasible in P4(λ, c, u0+ ε,Π0+ ε′) such that U`(C`) > U`(Ch), Uh(C`) > Uh(Ch) ≥ u0+ ε
and U`(C`) ≥ Φ4(λ, c, u0,Π0)− η.
Proposition 2 characterizes an optimal allocation of P4(λ, c, u0,Π0) when auditing
matters, that is when Φ4(λ, c, u0,Π0) ≥ Φ3(λ, c, u0,Π0). The proposition first states
that we necessarily have u0 < u0 in such a case. This is an intuitive result because
auditing is a way to deter h-types to choose the contract which is intended for `-types.
If the h-types minimal expected utility is larger than u0, then the problem we must face
is in fact to deter `-types to choose the contract intended for h-types and auditing is
useless in such a case.
Proposition 2-ii states that σ̂`` = 1 and 0 < σ̂h` < 1 at an optimal solution to
P4(λ, c, u0,Π0). Indeed if σ̂`` < 1 then `-types would weakly prefer Ch to C`, while
h-types would (strongly) prefer C` to Ch. The proof shows that allocating contracts
without auditing would be more efficient in such a case: in other words, we would have
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Φ4(λ, c, u0,Π0) < Φ3(λ, c, u0,Π0), hence a contradiction. σ̂h` = K(x`, λ, c) > 0 is just
a consequence of (20) and σ̂`` = 1: audit incentives require that h-types choose C`
with probability K(x`, λ, c) when `-types choose C` with probability 1. Furthermore
we have σ̂h` < 1 for otherwise we would get a pooling allocation where all individuals
choose C`. Auditing would be useless in such a case and we know from Proposition 1
that this pooling allocation is dominated in P3(λ, c, u0,Π0) when u0 6= u0. Proposition
2-ii then states that optimal contracts maximize the `-type expected utility with profit
larger or equal to Π0, under self-selection constraints (`-types weakly prefer C` to Ch
and h-types strictly prefer C` to Ch) and Ch should provide at least utility u0 to h-types.
Equations (22) to (25) are then satisfied with σ̂h` ∈ (0, 1), σ̂`` = 1 and p̂ ∈ (0, 1) such
that Uh(Ch) = Uh`(C`, p̂). Hence h-types randomize between Ch and C` because the
audit probability makes them indifferent between the two contracts, and their mixed
strategy makes insurers indifferent between auditing and not auditing.
Proposition 2-iii states that Ch is a full insurance contract with utility u0. Fur-
thermore C` provides overinsurance (i.e. k` + x` > A) if u0 = U∗h and Π0 = 0. This
contrasts sharply with the Rothschild-Stiglitz separating pair of contracts, where low
risk individuals are underinsured. The optimal contracts are in fact obtained by deleting
the `-types self selection constraint (32) and by checking ex post that it is satisfied by
the optimal solution of the relaxed problem. In this relaxed problem, it is optimal to
choose kh + xh = A and Uh(Ch) = u0, which gives U`(Ch) = Uh(Ch) < u0 < U`(C`).
Hence `-types and h-types strictly prefer C` to Ch.
When Π0 = 0 and u0 = U∗h , Ch = C
∗
h just breaks even. Using σ̂h` = K(x`, λ, c), a
straightforward calculation shows that C` also breaks even when k` = φ(x`), where
k` = φ(x`) ≡ pi`pihx
2
`
(1− pi`)pihx` − c(pih − pi`) , (35)
or equivalently, when k` = pi`[1 + σ(x`, c)](k` + x`) where σ(x`) is given by
σ(x`) ≡ λc(pih − pi`)
pihx` − c(pih − pi`) . (36)
Since k`+x` is the indemnity for C`, σ(x`) can be interpreted as a loading factor in the
insurance terminology. (36) shows that an increase in x` entails a decrease in the loading
factor. In other words, the marginal price of insurance is decreasing with respect to
coverage. This is just a consequence of the fact that σ̂h` = K(x`, λ, c) is decreasing in x` :
when the net indemnity provided by C` increases, insurers are incited to perform an audit
for a lower proportion of h-types among C`-claimants, hence less cross-subsidization
and a positive externality for `-types. This is illustrated in Figure 2. The locus PP ′ is
the zero profit line in the (W1,W2) plane, with equation W1 = WN − φ(W2 −WA)11.
11EL is an aymptote for PP ′. Furthermore, PP ′ crosses the 45◦ line if A/c is large enough. For
A/c small, PP ′ is entirely above the 45◦ line. See the proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix for
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We denote Ĉ` = (k̂`, x̂`) the C` contract at an optimal solution to P4(λ, c, U∗h , 0). Ĉ`
maximizes U`(k`, x`) subject to k` = φ(x`). In the (W1,W2) plane, Ĉ` is located at the
tangency of PP ′ and a `-type indifference curve, above the 45◦ line. As expected, the
lower the audit cost c, the lower the loading factor σ. PP ′ shifts rightwards when c is
decreasing and it goes to the low risk fair-odds line k` = pi`x`/(1 − pi`) when c goes to
zero. Hence Ĉ` goes to C∗` when c goes to zero.
Figure 2
Finally, Proposition 4-iv states that, if the `-types expected utility is lower than
4(λ, c, u0, Π0) and h-types reach expected utility u0, then it possible to improve the
welfare of everybody while increasing profit, through a pair of contracts with auditing
where `-types choose C` and h-types randomize between Ch and C`.
We will show later that the insurance market equilibrium can be characterized by
comparing Φ3(λ, c, U∗h , 0), Φ4(λ, c, U
∗
h , 0) = U`(Ĉ`) and U`(C
∗∗
` ). This comparison de-
pends on λ and c and it follows from some simple properties of Φ3 and Φ412. First, of
course ∂Φ3(λ, c, U∗h , 0)/∂c ≡ 0 because there is no auditing in P3(λ, c, U∗h , 0). Second, as
shown in Corollary 1, when λ < λ∗ then the optimal solution to P3(λ, c, U∗h , 0) requires
cross-subsidization between risk types and, as expected, the larger the proportion of
high risks in the population, the lower the expected utility that `-types may reach in
this problem. This gives ∂Φ3(λ, c, U∗h , 0)/∂λ < 0 if λ < λ
∗ and Φ3(λ, c, U∗h , 0) = U`(C
∗∗
` )
if λ ≥ λ∗. Third, when Φ4(λ, c, U∗h , 0) ≥ Φ3(λ, c, U∗h , 0) then at an optimal solution to
P4(λ, c, U∗h , 0), the proportion of h-types among the individuals who choose C` is inde-
pendent from λ: it depends on x` in such a way that insurers are indifferent between
auditing and no auditing13. In such a case any increase in λ does not affect the `-types op-
timal expected utility in P4(λ, c, U∗h , 0), which gives ∂Φ4(λ, c, U∗h , 0)/∂λ = 0. Conversely,
an increase in the cost of auditing increases the h-types proportion among the individu-
als who choose C`, hence an adverse effect on the `-types optimal expected utility, which
implies ∂Φ4(λ, c, U∗h , 0)/∂c < 0. Let c
∗ > 0 such that Φ4(λ, c∗, U∗h , 0) = U`(C
∗∗
` ). c
∗ is
the audit cost for which the `-types optimal expected utility with auditing is equal to
the `-types expected utility at the Rothshild-Stiglitz allocation. We can check thet c∗ is
uniquely defined because Φ4(λ, 0, U∗h , 0) = U`(C
∗
` ) > U`(C
∗∗
` ), Φ4(λ, c, U
∗
h , 0) < U`(C
∗∗
` )
for c large enough and Φ4(λ, c∗, U∗h , 0) is continuously decreasing in c and is inde-
pendent from λ. Let us also define c˜(λ) by Φ3(λ, c˜(λ), U∗h , 0) = Φ4(λ, c˜(λ), U
∗
h , 0) for
λ ∈ [0, λ∗] with c˜′(λ) > 0. Using Φ3(λ∗, c, U∗h , 0) = U`(C∗∗` ) gives c˜(λ∗) = c∗ and
Φ3(0, c, U∗h , 0) = U(C
∗
` ) = Φ4(λ, 0, U
∗
h , 0) gives c˜(0) = 0. Let Φ2(λ, c, u0,Π0) be the
computational details.
12See Corollaries 2 and 3 in Appendix for details.
13Equation (31) shows that this proportion is equal to cpi`/[cpi` + pih(x` − c)].
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value function to P2(λ, c, u0,Π0), with
Φ2(λ, c, u0,Π0) = max{Φ3(λ, c, u0,Π0),Φ4(λ, c, u0,Π0)}.
We thus have
Φ2(λ, c, U∗h , 0) = Φ3(λ, c, U
∗
h , 0) = U`(C
∗∗
` ) > Φ4(λ, c, U
∗
h , 0) if λ > λ
∗, c > c∗,
Φ2(λ, c, U∗h , 0) = Φ4(λ, c, U
∗
h , 0) = U`(Ĉ`) > Φ3(λ, c, U
∗
h , 0) if λ > λ
∗, c < c∗ or λ ≤ λ∗, c < c˜(λ),
Φ2(λ, c, U∗h , 0) = Φ3(λ, c, U
∗
h , 0) > max{U`(C∗∗` ), U`(Ĉ`)} if λ < λ∗, c > c˜(λ).
Using these results as well as Propositions 1 and 2, we are now able to fully charac-
terize the optimal solution to P2(λ, c, U∗h , 0). This is done in Proposition 3 which is a
straightforward consequence of our previous results.
Proposition 3. An optimal solution to P2(λ, c, U∗h , 0) is characterized by
(i) Ch = C∗h, C` = C
∗∗
` , σ̂hh = 1, σ̂h` = 0, σ̂`h = 0, σ̂`` = 1 if λ ≥ λ∗, c ≥ c∗,
(ii) Ch = C∗h, C` = Ĉ`, σ̂h` = K(x̂`, λ, c) ∈ (0, 1), σ̂hh = 1− σ̂h`, σ̂`h = 0, σ̂`` = 1
if c ≤ c∗, λ ≥ λ∗ or c ≤ c˜(λ), λ < λ∗,
(iii) Ch = (kh, xh), C` = (k`, x`) with kh + xh = A,Uh(Ch) > U∗h , k` + x` < A,
and σ̂hh = 1, σ̂h` = 0, σ̂`h = 0, σ̂`` = 1 if c ≥ c˜(λ), λ ≤ λ∗,
where Ĉ` = (k̂`, x̂`) is such that k̂` + x̂` > A and maximizes U`(C`) subject to
Π`(C`) +
cpi`
pih(x` − c)Πh(C`) ≥ 0.
If λ ≥ λ∗, c ≥ c∗, then the optimal solution to P2(λ, c, U∗h , 0) is reached in P3(λ, c, U∗h , 0):
it coincides with the Rothschild-Stiglitz allocation Ch = C∗h and C` = C
∗∗
` without au-
diting. This is area I in Figure 3. When λ > λ∗, c ≤ c∗ or λ ≤ λ∗, c ≤ c˜(λ), which corre-
sponds to area II, then the optimal solution to P2(λ, c, U∗h , 0) is reached in P4(λ, c, U∗h , 0)
with Ch = C∗h,C` = Ĉ` and random auditing p̂ ∈ (0, 1). In areas I and II, each con-
tract Ch and C` breaks even. Lastly, when λ ≤ λ∗, c ≥ c˜(λ), the optimal solution to
P2(λ, c, U∗h , 0) is reached in P3(λ, c, U∗h , 0), hence without any auditing, but it involves
cross-subsidization between Ch and C`. This is area III.
Figure 3
We are now in position to analyse the optimal solution to P1(λ, c, u0,Π10, ...,Πn0 )
by using our results about P2(λ, c, u0,Π0). It is convenient at this stage to define the
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following variables
N i = σihh + σ
i
h` + σ
i
`h + σ
i
``, λ
i =
σihh + σ
i
h`
N i
if N i > 0,
σ̂ihh =
λσihh
λiN i
, σ̂ih` =
λσih`
λiN i
if λiN i > 0,
σ̂i`h =
(1− λ)σi`h
(1− λi)N i , σ̂
i
`` =
(1− λ)σi``
(1− λi)N i if (1− λ
i)N i > 0.
N i ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of individuals who purchase insurance from insurer i and λi ∈
[0, 1] is the fraction of h-types among these policyholders. σ̂ihh, σ̂
i
h`, σ̂
i
`h, σ̂
i
`` specify the
contract choices of insurer i policyholders. P1(λ, c, u0,Π10, ...,Πn0 ) may then be rewritten
as
Maximize
n∑
i=0
N i(1− λi)
1− λ [σ̂
i
`hU`(C
i
h) + σ̂
i
``U`(C
i
`)]
with respect to Cih, C
i
`, p
i, i = 1, ..., n and N i, λi, σ̂ihh, σ̂
i
h`, σ̂
i
`h, σ̂
i
``, i = 0, ..., n, subject to
N iλi[σ̂ihhΠh(C
i
h) + σ̂
i
h`Πh(C
i
`)] +N
i(1− λi)[σ̂i`hΠ`(Cih) + σ̂i``Π`(Ci`)] ≥ Πi0
for all i = 1, ..., n,
(37)
λipihσ̂
i
h`x
i
` = c[λ
ipihσ̂
i
h` + (1− λi)pi`σ̂i``] if pi > 0 and N i > 0, i > 0, (38)
λipihσ̂
i
h`x
i
` ≤ c[λipihσ̂ih` + (1− λi)pi`σ̂i``] if pi = 0 and N i > 0, i > 0, (39)
n∑
i=0
N iλi
λ
[σ̂ihhUh(C
i
h) + σ̂
i
h`Uh`(C
i
`, p
i)] = max{Uh(Cih), Uh`(Ci`, pi), i = 1, ..., n},(40)
n∑
i=0
N i(1− λi)
1− λ [σ̂
i
`hU`(C
i
h) + σ̂
i
``U`(C
i
`)] = max{U`(Cih), U`(Ci`), i = 1, ..., n}, (41)
n∑
i=0
N iλi
λ
[σ̂ihhUh(C
i
h) + σ̂
i
h`Uh`(C
i
`, p
i)] ≥ u0, (42)
n∑
i=0
N i = 1,
n∑
i=0
λiN i = λ and N i ≥ 0, λi ≥ 0 if i ≥ 0, (43)
Ci ∈ R4+, pi ∈ [0, 1] if i > 0, (σ̂ihh, σ̂ih`) ∈ S1, (σ̂i`h, σ̂i``) ∈ S1 if i ≥ 0. (44)
Let P̂1(λ, c, u0,Π10, ...,Πn0 ) denote this new way of writing problem P1(λ, c, u0,Π10, ...,Πn0 ).
Proposition 4. P̂1(λ, c, u0, 0, ..., 0) has feasible solutions if and only if u0 ∈ [Uh, û0(λ, c)]
where û0(λ, c) ≡ sup{u0 s.t. Φ2(λ, c, u0, 0) ≥ U `} ∈ (U∗h , U∗` ). Let {Ci ≡ (Cih, Ci`), pi, N i, λi,
σ̂ihh, σ̂
i
h`, σ̂
i
`h, σ̂
i
``, i = 0, ..., n} be an optimal solution to P̂1(λ, c, u0, 0, ..., 0) when u0 ∈
[Uh, û0(λ, c)]. Let ui0 = max{Uh(Cih), Uh`(Ci`, pi)} for i = 0, ..., n and u′0 = max{u00, ..., un0}.
Then N0 = 0 and {Ci, pi, σ̂ihh, σ̂ih`, σ̂i`h, σ̂i``} is an optimal solution to P2(λ, c, u0, 0) for
all i > 0 such that N i > 0 . Furthermore if u′0 6= U∗h , then λi = λ for all i. If u′0 = U∗h
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and U`(C∗∗` ) > U`(Ĉ`), then
Cih = C
∗
h, σ̂
i
hh = 1, σ̂
i
h` = 1 if N
iλi > 0,
Ci` = C
∗∗
` , σ̂
i
`h = 0, σ̂
i
`` = 1, p
i = 0 if N i(1− λi) > 0.
If u′0 = U∗h and U`(C
∗∗
` ) < U`(Ĉ`), then λ
i > 0 for all i such that N i > 0 and
Cih = C
∗
h, σ̂
i
hh = 1 if λ
i = 1, N i > 0
Cih = C
∗
h, σ̂
i
hh = 1−K(x`, λi, c) if λi < 1,K(x`, λi, c) < 1, N i > 0
Ci` = Ĉ`, Uh`(Ĉ`, p
i) = U∗h , σ̂
i
h` = K(x`, λ
i, c) ∈ (0, 1], σ̂i`h = 0, σ̂i`` = 1 if λi < 1, N i > 0.
When u0 is larger than the threshold û0, then it is impossible to simultaneously
provide expected utility larger than U ` to `-types and larger than u0 to h-types, and
in such a case the set of feasible solutions to P̂1(λ, c, u0, 0, ..., 0) is empty. When u0 ∈
[Uh, û0] the optimal solution to P̂1(λ, c, u0, 0, ..., 0) is symmetric: generically, all insurers
(at least those with customers) offer the same menu of contracts and they have the same
auditing strategy as at the optimal solution to P2(λ, c, u0, 0). No individual remains
uninsured. In Proposition 4, u′0 denotes the h-types’ expected utility: it is the left-hand
side in (42), with u′0 ≥ u0. When u′0 6= U∗h , then all insurers get the same proportions
of high risks and low risks among their customers (i.e. λi = λ for all i such that
N i > 0) and {Ci, pi, σ̂ihh, σ̂ih`, σ̂i`h, σ̂i``} is an optimal solution to P2(λ, c, u0, 0). To get
the intuition of this result, consider the case u′0 > U∗h , which implies that insurers make
losses on h-types. If 0 < λi < λj < 1 and N i, N j > 0, then `-types and h-types reach the
same expected utility from insurer i than from insurer j, while the burden of high risk
individuals is larger (per insured) for insurer j than for insurer i. The offer of insurer
i would be inefficient in such case since she could make a more advantageous offer to
`-types while providing the same expected utility to h-types and making non-negative
profits. The proof of the Proposition elaborates on this intuitive argument (extended
to the case u′0 < U∗h) to establish that the optimal proportion of high risk individuals
is the same for all insurers and consequently all insurers offer the same contracts, with
the same auditing strategy. When u′0 = U∗h , then the distribution of h-types and `-
types is arbitrary (we may have λi 6= λj , N i > 0, N j > 0) and {Ci, pi, σ̂ihh, σ̂ih`, σ̂i`h,
σ̂i``} is an optimal solution to P2(λi, c, u0, 0). However, this optimal solution does not
depend on λi when u′0 = U∗h (indeed in such a case, it is neither a burden nor an
advantage to have a large proportion of high risk individuals among the insureds) : we
have Cih = C
∗
h and either C
i
` = C
∗∗
` , p
i = 0 if U`(C∗∗` ) > U`(Ĉ`) or C
i
` = Ĉ`, p
i = p̂ such
that Uh`(Ĉ`, p̂) = U∗h otherwise. Hence, whatever the value of u
′
0, all insurers should
offer the same menu of contracts, with the same auditing strategy. Since a second–best
Pareto-optimal allocation {C, p, σh, σ`} is an optimal solution to P̂1(λ, c, u0, 0, ..., 0), with
19
u0 =
∑n
i=0[σ
i
hhUh(C
i
h)+σ
i
h`Uh`(C
i
`, p
i)], Proposition 4 allows us to conclude that such an
allocation is symmetric with the same contracts and audit probability as at the optimal
solution to P2(λ, c, u0, 0). Finally, Propositions 1,2 and 4 jointly show that there is cross-
subsidization between contracts when u′0 6= U∗h : when u′0 > U∗h , then Cih is in deficit and
Ci` is profitable for all i such that N
i > 0 and the situation is reversed when u′0 < U∗h .
On the contrary, each contract breaks even when u′0 = U∗h .
5 Existence and characterization of market equilibrium
Let us consider the conditions under which an equilibrium allocation is second-best
Pareto-optimal. Intuitively, if this were not the case, then a deviant insurer - say insurer
j - could offer a menu of contracts Cjh, C
j
` that would be advantageous to all individuals
while making positive profit, hence a contradiction with the definition of an equilibrium.
In the Rothschild-Stiglitz model, this kind of argument directly shows that λ ≥ λ∗ is
a necessary condition for C∗h, C
∗∗
` to be an equilibrium offer and, as we know, it is also
a sufficient condition14. The matter is less trivial here since the auditing probability of
any insurer i may be changed if insurer j deviates from her equilibrium contract offer.
Formally, we may have pi ≡ p˜i(C˜) 6= p˜i(Cj , C˜−j) if Cj 6= C˜j . In such a case, we may
conceive that an inefficient feasible allocation cannot be destabilized by insurer j because
the change in pi makes the deviation unprofitable. More explicitly, if p˜i(Cj , C˜−j) < pi,
then h-types may decide to choose C˜i after Cj is offered in deviation, even if the new offer
(provided that it attracts everybody) Pareto-dominates the equilibrium allocation. This
may make the deviation unprofitable. More explicitly, consider a contract C˜i` = (k˜
i
`, x˜
i
`)
not chosen on the equilibrium path (i.e. σih` = σ
i
`` = 0) and such that p
i > 0 and
Uh`(C˜i`, p
i) < U eh < Uh(C˜
i
`). In words, at equilibrium h-types are detered from choosing
C˜i` because they fear they may be audited. In some circumstances, C˜
i
` may act as an
implicit threat to prevent deviant insurer j to attract h-types. Let us focus on the case
where U eh < Uh(C
j
h) < U
∗
h , U`(C
j
h) < U
e
` ,Πh(C
j
h) > 0 and C
j
` = (0, 0), where U
e
` denotes
the `-type equilibrium expected utility. In words, insurer j aims at making profit by
attracting h-types and her offer is strictly dominated for `-types15.
Suppose first that U`(C˜i`) < U
e
` . In that case only h-types may choose C˜
i
` after
insurer j’s deviation. We know from Lemma 1 that pi > 0 requires x˜i` ≥ c. If x˜i` > c and
if a h-type individual chooses C˜i` after the deviation (i.e. if σ˜
i
h`(C
j , C˜−j) > 0), we would
have µ˜i(Cj , C˜−j) = 1 and thus p˜i(Cj , C˜−j) = 1, which makes C˜i` unattractive to h-types.
However if x˜i` = c, then insurer i is indifferent between auditing and not auditing when
C˜i` is chosen by h-types only and (for instance) p˜
i(Cj , C˜−j) = 0, σ˜ih`(C
j , C˜−j) = 1 is a
14Of course, we here consider the version of the Rothschild-Stiglitz model where each insurer offers
a menu of contracts. If each insurer can only offer one contract, then a Rothshild-Stiglitz equilibrium
exists but is not second-best Pareto-optimal when bλ < λ < λ∗.
15We here assume that contracts offered by other insurers j′ 6= j allow `-types to still reach Ue` after
the deviation.
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continuation equilibrium strategy where insurer j does not attract h-types. Note however
that in such a case, insurer i would play a weakly dominated strategy on the equilibrium
path: indeed when x˜i` = c then p
i > 0 is an optimal strategy of insurer i only if µi = 1, i.e.
if C˜i` is chosen by h-types only. If `-types may unintentionally choose C˜
i
` with a positive
probability, then pi = 0 would be the only equilibrium strategy. In other words, errors
in the `-types’ decisions jeopardize the use of auditing as an implicit threat to prevent
deviations at the contract offer stage. Assuming that insurers play weakly dominated
strategy is probably not very convincing and in our main results this possibility is
ruled out by resorting to the trembling hand perfection criterion of Selten (1975)16.
In what follows, we say that an equilibrium E = {C˜, p˜(.), σ˜h(.), σ˜`(.), µ˜(.)} satisfies the
THP condition if {p, σh, σ`} is a trembling hand perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the
continuation subgame that follows the equilibrium offer C˜, hence the following Lemma.
Lemma 3. At any equilibrium E = {C˜, p˜(.), σ˜h(.), σ˜`(.), µ˜(.)} that satisfies THP, we
have pi = 0 for all i such that x˜i` = c
Under the THP condition, if x˜i` = c then decreasing the audit probability of C˜
i
`
cannot act as an implicit threat to prevent a deviant insurer to attract h-types. Any
equilibrium allocation is then second-best Pareto-optimal (see Proposition 5). As we
shall see later, this is not necessarily the case if the THP condition is not satisfied.
Suppose now U`(C˜i`) = U
e
` . Hence C˜
i
` belongs to the set of equilibrium contracts
that are optimal for `-type individuals. These individuals may conceivably change their
contract choice following the new offer by insurer j, and in particular we may have
σ˜i``(C
j , C˜−j) > σi`` = 0. Given this change in the way `-types randomize between
contracts, the equilibrium audit probabilities may also change. In particular, we may
have p˜i(Cj , C˜−j) < pi and Uh`(C˜i`, p˜
i(Cj , C˜−j)) > Uh(C
j
h). In such a case, h-types
would not choose Cjh - i.e. σ˜
j
hh(C
j , C˜−j) = 0 - and insurer j wouldn’t make any profit
in the deviation. In fact, in this scenario, a change in strictly dominated contracts
(i.e. the deviation from C˜j to Cj) acts as a sunspot for `-types: they modify the
way they randomize between contracts although there is no change in the set of their
optimal contracts. This is conceptually possible but not very convincing from the
realism standpoint. In our main characterization of the equilibrium, we will dismiss this
possibility by appealing to a Markov-type restriction on the `-types strategy. We will
say that a `-type strategy σ`(.) is stable with respect to changes in strictly dominated
strategies if σ`(C) = σ`(C ′) when C and C ′ only differ through contracts that are strictly
dominated for `-types and we say that E satisfies SDS if σ˜`(.) is stable with respect to
changes in strictly dominated strategies. Restricting attention to the case where E
satisfies SDS is in the spirit of the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE ) concept17. In
an extensive-form game, a MPE is a profile of strategies that are a perfect equilibrium
16The definition of trembling hand perfection is reminded in the proof of Lemma 3 in the Appendix.
17See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Ch.13) and Maskin-Tirole (2001).
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and that are measurable with respect to the payoff-relevant history: in other words,
only changes in payoff-relevant past events can affect the players’ strategy. The SDS
condition is thus a variation on the MPE concept where the restriction on strategies
only concerns `-type individuals: their choices are not affected by changes in the offer
of strictly dominated contracts.
Proposition 5. Any equilibrium allocation that satisfies THP is second-best Pareto-
optimal and it is an optimal solution to P1(λ,U eh, 0, ..., 0) with U eh ≤ U∗h . If the equilib-
rium also satisfies SDS , then U eh = U
∗
h .
Propositions 4 with u0 = u′0 = U eh and Proposition 5 jointly show that under THP all
insurers (at least those who attract customers) offer the same equilibrium contracts and
they play the same auditing strategy as at the optimal solution to P2(λ, c, U eh, 0). If SDS
is postulated in addition, then U eh = U
∗
h and the equilibrium allocation is characterized
as in Proposition 4 with u′0 = U∗h , which means that the equilibrium is second-best
Pareto optimal without cross-subsidization between contracts. In particular, since U∗h ∈
[Uh, ûh(λ, c)], all individuals purchase insurance at equilibrium.
Under THP and SDS, only two types of equilibrium may thus generically occur.
When U`(C∗∗` ) > U`(Ĉ`), a candidate equilibrium is such that h-types choose C
∗
h and
`-types choose C∗∗` : it is a separating equilibrium without auditing. When U`(C
∗∗
` ) <
U`(Ĉ`), a candidate equilibrium is such that h-types randomize between C∗h and Ĉ`
while `-types only choose Ĉ` : it is a semi-separating equilibrium. The risk type of Ĉ`-
claimants is then randomly audited and the audit probability makes h-types indifferent
between C∗h and Ĉ`.
For all i, let N i = σihh + σ
i
h` + σ
i
`h + σ
i
`` with N
0 = 0 and λi = (σihh + σ
i
h`)/N
i
if N i > 0, with
∑n
i=1N
i = 1 and
∑n
i=1N
i
λ
i = λ. Propositions 6 and 7 provide
necessary and sufficient conditions for a separating equilibrium and for a semi-separating
equilibrium to exist.
Proposition 6. Under THP and SDS, there exists a separating equilibrium E = {C˜, p˜(.), σ˜h(.),
σ˜`(.), µ˜(.)} if and only if c ≥ c∗ and λ ≥ λ∗. The separating equilibrium allocation coin-
cides with the Rothschild-Stiglitz allocation and there is no type verification on the equi-
librium path, i.e. C˜ih = C
∗
h, σ̂
i
hh = 1, σ̂
i
h` = 0 if N
i
λ
i
> 0 and C˜i` = C
∗∗
` , σ̂
i
`h = 0, σ̂
i
`` = 1
if N i(1− λi) > 0.
We know from Propositions 4 and 5 that under THP and SDS a separating equilib-
rium is such that C˜ih = C
∗
h and C˜
i
` = C
∗∗
` for any insurer i that attracts h-types and `-
types. In other words, the separating equilibrium contracts coincide with the Rothschild-
Stiglitz pair of contracts. A separating equilibrium requires U`(C∗∗` ) ≥ U`(Ĉ`), or equiv-
alently U`(C∗∗` ) ≥ Φ4(λ, c, U∗h , 0). Under this inequality, a deviant insurer i cannot make
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positive profit by offering a menu Ci with auditing in the continuation equilibrium, i.e.
with p˜i(Ci, C˜−i) > 0. For a separating equilibrium to exist it should also be impossible
for insurer i to make profit by attracting all individuals without auditing, i.e. with
p˜i(Ci, C˜−i) = 0, which requires U`(C∗∗` ) = Φ3(λ, c, U
∗
h , 0). Hence a necessary condition
for a separating equilibrium is
U`(C∗∗` ) = Φ3(λ, c, U
∗
h , 0) ≥ Φ4(λ, c, U∗h , 0),
or equivalently λ ≥ λ∗, c ≥ c∗. Conversely, as shown in the proof of Proposition 6, under
this condition, any deviation from C˜i = (C∗h, C
∗∗
` ) to another menu C
i is unprofitable
at a continuation equilibrium. Hence a separating equilibrium exists if and only if (λ, c)
is in the area I of Figure 5, boundary line included.
Proposition 7. Under THP and SDS, there exists a semi-separating equilibrium E =
{C˜, p˜(.), σ˜h(.), σ˜`(.), µ˜(.)} if and only if c ≤ c∗ , λ ≥ λ∗ or c ≤ c˜(λ), λ < λ∗. At a
semi-separating allocation, `-types choose Ĉ` while h-types randomize between C∗h and
Ĉ` and the risk type of Ĉ`-claimants is audited with positive probability. For all i such
that N i > 0, we have
C˜i` = Ĉ`, Uh`(Ĉ`, p
i) = U∗h , σ̂
i
h` = K(x̂`, λ
i
, c) ∈ (0, 1], σ̂i`h = 0, σ̂i`` = 1 if λi < 1,
C˜ih = C
∗
h, σ̂
i
hh = 1−K(x`, λi, c) if λi < 1,K(x`, λi, c) < 1
C˜ih = C
∗
h, σ̂
i
hh = 1, σ̂
i
h` = 0 if λ
i = 1.
Any semi-separating equilibrium is such that C˜ih = C
∗
h and C˜
i
` = Ĉ` for any contract
that attracts customers. The proportion of h-types among the individuals who choose
a Ci` contract is the same for all i: it is equal to cpi`/[cpi` + pih(x̂` − c)]. When λ
i is
larger than this proportion (i.e. when K(x`, λ
i
, c) < 1) then other h-type customers of
insurer i choose C˜ih
18. As shown in Proposition 3, Ĉ` involves overinsurance, which is in
sharp contrast with the Rothschild-Stiglitz separating equilibrium19. A semi-separating
equilibrium requires U`(Ĉ`) ≥ U`(C∗∗` ), or equivalently Φ4(λ, c, U∗h , 0) ≥ U`(C∗∗` ). In
that case, a deviant insurer cannot make profit by offering a pair of incentive compatible
contracts without cross-subsidization. The existence of a semi-separating equilibrium
also requires that a deviant insurer cannot make profit by cross-subsidizing incentive
compatible contracts, which may be written as
Φ4(λ, c, U∗h , 0) ≥ Φ3(λ, c, U∗h , 0),
18Since K(bx`, λ, c) < 1, there is an infinite number of possible distributions of individuals among
insurers.
19In practice, the insureds’ moral hazard may make insurers reluctant to offer such overinsurance
contracts. The optimal contract would then trade off the incentives to costly risk verification and
the mitigation of insureds’ moral hazard. For instance, if we simply impose that claims shouldn’t be
overpaid, the semi-separating equilibrium is at point F on Figure 2, with full coverage of losses.
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and equivalently λ > λ∗, c ≤ c∗ or λ ≤ λ∗, c ≤ c˜(λ) as stated in Proposition 7. Con-
versely, under this condition, any deviation from C˜i = (C∗h, Ĉ`) to C
i is unprofitable at
a continuation equilibrium. Hence a semi-separating equilibrium exists when (λ, c) is in
the area II of Figure 5, with its boundary line. Finally, no equilibrium exists in area III.
An equilibrium allocation is thus a second-best Pareto optimal allocation that breaks
even.
We may conclude these comments on Propositions 6 and 7 with some straightforward
but important remarks. Firstly, if the insurers were not allowed to void the contract
when misrepresentation is established, then an equilibrium would exist only if λ ≥ λ∗
as in the standard Rothschild-Stiglitz model. Hence allowing the insurers to void the
contract enlarges the set of parameters for which an equilibrium exists. The smaller the
verification cost c, the smaller the threshold for λ above which an equilibrium exists.
Equivalently, for any λ, an equilibrium always exists if c is small enough. If c were
equal to zero, uncertainty on the insureds’ risk type would vanish and competition on
the insurance market would lead to type separation and full insurance at fair price.
When c goes to zero, then Ĉ` goes to C∗` without any discontinuity at c = 0: the
equilibrium semi-separating allocation then converges to the full information solution.
On the contrary, there is a discontinuity in insurance coverage and premium when c
reaches the threshold c∗ since we go from partial coverage in the separating equilibrium
area I to overinsurance in the semi-separating equilibrium area II. Last but not least, the
semi-separating equilibrium (when it exists) Pareto-dominates the Rothschild-Stiglitz
equilibrium since the welfare of high risk individuals is increased while the low risks’
expected utility is unchanged. All things considered, although insurers cannot commit
on their verification strategy, allowing them to void the contract improves efficiency in
the market and makes existence of equilibrium more likely.
Proposition 5 suggests that an equilibrium that does not satisfy THP may not be
second-best Pareto efficient. This is actually the case as shown by the following example.
Assume n = 4, λ > λ∗ and c > c∗. For i = 1 or 2, let C˜ih = (pihÂ, Â − pihÂ) with pih >
pih, Â 6= A and C˜i` is such that
Uh(C˜i`) = Uh(C˜
i
h) and (1− λ)Π`(C˜i`) + λ(pih − pih)Â = 0.
When pih−pih and Â−A goes to 0, (C˜1h, C˜1` ) and (C˜2h, C˜2` ) converge to (C∗h, C∗∗` ) which is
the optimal solution to P2(λ, c, U∗h , 0). For i = 3 or 4, let C˜ih = (0, 0) and C˜i` = (k˜i`, x˜i`) =
(k˜i`, c), where k˜
i
` is such that
Uh(C˜i`) > U
∗
h and U`(C˜
i
`) < U`(C˜
1
` ) = U`(C˜
2
` ).
Let σihh = σ
i
`` = 1/2 for i = 1 or 2, p
1 = p2 = 0, p3 = p4 = 1, µ1 = µ2 = 0 and
µ3 = µ4 = 1. In words, on the equilibrium path h -types choose C˜1h or C˜
2
h and ` -types
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choose C˜1` or C˜
2
` and nobody chooses the contracts offered by insurers i = 3 or 4. h-type
individuals are detered from choosing C˜3` or C˜
4
` because p
3 = p4 = 1 and this auditing
strategy is optimal for insurers 3 and 4 given the out of equilibrium beliefs µ3 = µ4 = 1.
The couples of contracts C˜1h, C˜
1
` and C˜
2
h, C˜
2
` are incentive compatible and no auditing
is performed on the equilibrium path. Furthermore there is cross-subsidization between
C˜1h and C˜
1
` : insurer 1 makes profit with C˜
1
h and losses with C˜
1
` . Likewise for insurer
2. When pih − pih is not too large, then A ≡{C˜ih, C˜i`, pi, σihh, σih`, σi`h, σi``; i = 1, ..., 4} is
not second-best Pareto-optimal since Â 6= A. However, for any deviation to a pair of
contracts that Pareto-dominates A, there exists continuous equilibrium strategies that
make it non-profitable. Consider for example the case where insurer 1 deviates from
C˜1 = (C˜1h, C˜
1
` ) to C
1 = (C1h, C
1
` ) with C
1
h = (pi
′
hA,A − pi′hA), pih < pi′h < pih and C1` is
such that Uh(C1` ) = Uh(C
1
h) and (1− λ)Π`(C1` ) + λ(pi′h − pih)A > 0. For pi′h − pih small
enough, we have Uh(C1h) > U
e
h and U`(C
1
` ) > U
e
` , where U
e
h and U
e
` are the expected
utility of h-types and `-types at A. Intuitively, insurer 1 aims at attracting h-types
through C1h and `-types through C
1
` . Consider the strategy p˜
3(C1, C˜−1) = 0 and beliefs
µ˜3(C1, C˜−1) = 1 for all C1 6= C˜1. Note that these beliefs are consistent with the strategy
of the individuals since C˜3` is not chosen by `-types (they prefer C˜
1
` or C˜
2
` to C˜
3
` ): C˜
3
` can
only be chosen by h-types. Given these beliefs, p˜3(C1, C˜−1) = 0 is an optimal strategy
of insurer 3 because x˜i` = c. σ˜
3
h`(C
1, C˜−1) = 1 is then an optimal strategy of h-types:
they do not choose C1h and consequently the deviation is unprofitable. Symmetrically,
there exists continuation equilibrium strategies that make any deviation by insurer 2
non profitable. In case of deviation by insurer 3, p˜4(C3, C˜−3) = 0 is a continuation
equilibrium strategy of insurer 4, and here also the deviation cannot attract h-types.
Likewise, p˜3(C4, C˜−4) = 0 is a continuation equilibrium strategy of insurer 3 that make
any deviation by insurer 4 non profitable. In this example, insurers 3 and 4 play a
weakly dominated strategy on the equilibrium path: they choose p3 = p4 = 1, which
is an optimal strategy for their out-of-equilibrium beliefs µ3 = µ4 = 1. Decreasing p3
from 1 to 0, after any deviation by insurer i 6= 3 is an implicit threat that prevents the
deviation to be profitable. Such an equilibrium would vanish if insurers do not play
weakly dominated strategies, which is the case under the THP condition.
Proposition 5 also suggests that we may have U eh < U
∗
h (and thus positive profit
on h-types) at an equilibrium that does not satisfy SDS. This is true, as shown by the
following example. Assume n = 4 and either c < c∗, λ ≥ λ∗ or c < c˜(λ), λ < λ∗. For
i = 1 or 2, let (C˜ih, C˜
i
`) be the optimal solution to P4(λ, c, u(WN − pihA), 0) with pih >
pih. When pih− pih goes to 0, (C˜1h, C˜1` ) and (C˜2h, C˜2` ) converge to (C∗h, Ĉ`) which is the
optimal solution to P2(λ, c, U∗h , 0). For i = 3 or 4, let C˜ih = (0, 0) and C˜i` = (k˜i`, x˜i`) such
that
U`(C˜i`) = U`(C˜
1
` ) = U`(C˜
2
` ), Uh(C˜
i
`) > U
∗
h and c < x˜
i
` <
c[(1− λ)pi` + λpih]
λpih
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For i = 1 or 2, let σih` = K(x˜
i
`, λ, c)/2, σ
i
hh = [1−K(x˜i`, λ, c)]/2, σi`` = 1/2, σi`h = 0 and
Uh`(C˜i`, p
i) = Uh(C˜ih). For i = 3 or 4, let σ
i
h` = σ
i
hh = σ
i
`` = σ
i
`h = 0, µ
i = 1 and pi = 1.
A ≡{C˜ih, C˜i`, pi, σihh, σih`, σi`h, σi``; i = 1, ..., 4} is second-best Pareto-optimal if pih− pih
is not too large. The only way to make a profitable deviation is to attract only h-types.
Consider for example the case where insurer 1 deviates from C˜1 = (C˜1h, C˜
1
` ) to another
pair of contracts C1 = (C1h, C
1
` ) that attracts h-types, but not `-types. We may assume
w.l.o.g. that C1` = (0, 0). A necessary condition for this deviation to be profitable is
Uh(C1h) < U
∗
h . Let σ˜
i
h` ≡ σ˜ih`(C1, C˜−1), σ˜i`` ≡ σ˜ih`(C1, C˜−1) and p˜i ≡ p˜i(C1, C˜−1) for
i = 1, ..., 4. This continuation equilibrium strategy profile (and the corresponding beliefs
µ˜i ≡ µ˜i(C1, C˜−1)) can be chosen in such a way that h-types and `-types randomize
between C˜2` or C˜
3
` and they choose neither C
1 nor C˜4` . Indeed, let σ˜
2
``+ σ˜
3
`` = 1. Choose
p˜2 and p˜3 such that Uh(C˜i`, p˜
i) = U∗h for i = 2 and 3 and p˜
1 = p˜4 = 1. Given
the `-types’ contract choice strategy, the insurers’ auditing strategy and the h-types’
contract choice strategy are mutual best responses when σ˜2h` + σ˜
3
h` = 1, σ˜
2
h` = σ˜
2
``K˜
2
and σ˜3h` = σ˜
3
``K˜
3, where K˜i ≡ K(x˜i`, λ, c) for i = 2 and 3 and K˜2 < 1 < K˜3. These
conditions are fulfilled when σ˜2h` = K˜
2(K˜3−1)/(K˜3−K˜2), σ˜3h` = K˜3(1−K˜2)/(K˜3−K˜2),
σ˜2`` = (K˜
3−1)/(K˜3−K˜2) and σ˜3`` = (1−K˜2)/(K˜3−K˜2). The same kind of continuation
equilibrium exists in case of a deviation by insurers 2, 3 or 4. In this equilibrium, σ`(.)
is not stable with respect to changes in strongly dominated strategies because once C1
is proposed by insurer 1 in deviation from equilibrium, then `-types choose C˜2` or C˜
3
`
while they chose C˜1` or C˜
2
` before the deviation. This equilibrium is Pareto-optimal but
U eh < U
∗
h and insurers 1 and 2 cross-subsidize their contracts. Such an equilibrium would
vanish under the SDS condition.
Note finally that in these two examples, pih may be chosen such that Uh(Cih) = Uh for
i = 1, 2, so that h-types do not draw any surplus from insurance. Simple variations on
the examples would lead to market equilibria where h-types randomize between C˜1h or C˜
2
h
and no-insurance. However, given the lack of robustness of the underlying strategy, such
equilibria should probably be considered a theoretical curiosity rather than a realistic
view of the insurance market.
6 Conclusion
The good faith principle is a major pillar of the law of insurance contracts. It states
that insureds have a duty of good faith and it allows insurers to rescind contracts ex post
when intentional misrepresentation of risk is established. Thereby it contributes to more
efficient risk sharing in insurance markets under asymmetric information. However the
effects of the good faith principle may conceivably be weakened or even cancelled by a
credibility constraint on the verification strategy.
In order to better understand the effects of this credibility constraint, we have ana-
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lyzed the equilibrium of an insurance market where applicants for insurance have a duty
of good faith when revealing their risk type and insurers cannot precommit to their
risk verification policy. Three main results have been reached. Firstly, the equilibrium
qualitatively differs from the one that prevails in the standard Rothschild-Stiglitz model
: here it may be either separating or semi-separating. At a semi-separating equilibrium,
there is some degree of bad faith from high risk individuals : they do not always re-
veal their risk type truthfully. Furthermore, low risk individuals get overinsurance at a
semi-separating equilibrium, contrary to the main prediction of the standard Rothschild-
Stiglitz model. Secondly, the possibility of cancealing the contract when bad faith is
established extends the set of parameters for which a competitive equilibrium exists. In
particular, an equilibrium always exists if the verification cost is low enough. Thirdly,
the good faith principle remains Pareto-improving in comparison with the Rothschild -
Stiglitz equilibrium, although insurers are deprived of any possibility of precommitment
in their risk verification strategy.
We have approached these issues in two stages. The first stage consisted in character-
izing second-best Pareto optimal allocations and, in a second stage, we have shown that,
under adequate assumptions, the equilibrium allocation is second-best Pareto-optimal
without cross-subsidization between contracts. In a sense, this is a very natural result.
Intuitively, an equilibrium allocation is necessarily second-best Pareto optimal for other-
wise it would be possible to offer a profitable menu of contracts that would attract all the
individuals. Furthermore, an equilibrium allocation does not cross-subsidize contracts
for otherwise it would be to the insurers’ advantage to delete the contract in deficit.
Although the general principle of this argument is true, it requires careful attention.
The two main difficulties were firstly to establish the symmetry of second-best Pareto-
optimal allocations and secondly to characterize the precise conditions under which an
equilibrium allocation is second-best Pareto optimal without cross-subsidization. This
roundabout way through second-best Pareto-optimality is not trivial and one may find
it somewhat tedious, but we think it is an adequate way to characterize the equilibrium
of a market under adverse selection. Hopefully a similar approach may be useful for the
analysis of other markets with adverse selection where agents interact after the contract
offer stage, such as the credit market or the labour market.
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Appendix
This Appendix gathers the proofs of the Lemmas, Propositions and Corollary stated
in the paper. Lemmas 4 to 8 and Corollaries 2 to 4 are intermediate stages of the proofs.
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider an equilibrium E . (5) gives
p˜i(C) = 0 (resp. ∈ [0, 1],= 1) if µ˜i(C)xi` < c (resp. = c,> c) for all i and all C. (45)
Assume that σ˜ih`(C) + σ˜
i
``(C) > 0. If p˜
i(C) = 1, then Uh`(Ci`, p˜
i(C)) < Uh and thus
σ˜ih`(C) = 0. We get µ˜
i(C) = 0 from (7) and then (45) gives p˜i(C) = 0, hence a
contradiction. We thus have p˜i(C) < 1. Using (45) then gives (8). When σ˜ih`(C) = 0
and σ˜i``(C) > 0, we have µ˜
i(C) = 0 from (7) and then(45) gives p˜i(C) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2: Using (8) yields
λσ˜ih`(C)Π`h(C
i
`, p˜
i(C)) + (1− λ)σ˜i``(C)Π``(Ci`, p˜i(C))
= λσ˜ih`(C)Π`h(C
i
`, 0) + (1− λ)σ˜i``(C)Π``(Ci`, 0).
(9) then follows from Π`h(Ci`, 0) = Πh(C
i
`) and Π``(C
i
`, 0) = Π`(C
i
`).
Proof of Proposition 1: (i) and (ii). P3(λ, c, u0,Π0) is obtained by imposing p̂ = 0
and deleting (20) in P2(λ, c, u0,Π0). Assume σ̂hh > 0 and σ̂h` > 0 in P3(λ, c, u0,Π0).
(22), (24) and p̂ = 0 then give Uh(Ch) = Uh`(C`, 0) = Uh(C`) ≥ u0. Indifference
curves of h-types and `-types cross only once. Hence we have either U`(C`) > U`(Ch) or
U`(C`) < U`(Ch). Assume U`(C`) > U`(Ch). (23) then gives σ̂`` = 1 and σ̂`h = 0. Let
C ′h = (k
′
h, x
′
h) be defined by C
′
h = σ̂h`C` + σ̂hhCh. Using u
′′ < 0 gives
Uh(C ′h) > Uh(Ch) = Uh(C`) ≥ u0. (46)
Furthermore
Πh(C ′h) = σ̂hhΠh(Ch) + σ̂h`Πh(C`). (47)
Hence there exists C ′′h = (k
′′
h, x
′′
h), k
′′
h > k
′
h, x
′′
h < x
′
h such that
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Πh(C ′′h) > σ̂hhΠh(Ch) + σ̂h`Πh(C`), (48)
Uh(C ′′h) = Uh(Ch) = Uh(C`) ≥ u0, (49)
U`(Ch) < U`(C ′′h) < U`(C`). (50)
20This can be checked by drawing the h-type and `-type indifference curves going through C` in the
(W1,W2) plane with U`(C`) > U`(Ch).
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σ̂`` = 1, (19) and (48) show that there exists C ′` in a neighbourhood of C` such that
λΠh(C ′′h) + (1− λ)Π`(C ′`) ≥ Π0, (51)
U`(C ′`) > U`(C`), (52)
Uh(C`) > Uh(C ′`). (53)
We deduce from (50) and (52) that
U`(C ′`) > U`(C
′′
h). (54)
Lastly (49) and (53) give
Uh(C ′′h) ≥ u0 and Uh(C ′′h) > Uh(C ′`). (55)
Hence there exist C ′`, C
′′
h such that (51), (54) and (55) are satisfied which shows that
C`, Ch is dominated in P3(λ, c, u0,Π0) by a feasible solution with σ̂`` = 1. A similar
conclusion is obtained when U`(C`) < U`(Ch) by inverting the roles of C` and Ch. Hence
any feasible solution to P3(λ, c, u0,Π0) where h-types randomize between contracts is
dominated by a solution where they don’t. We can thus restrict attention to solutions
such that either σ̂hh = 1, σ̂h` = 0 or σ̂h` = 1, σ̂hh = 0.
Assume σ̂hh = 1, σ̂h` = 0 : (22) and p̂ = 0 then give Uh(Ch) ≥ Uh(C`). Suppose
σ̂`h > 0 and σ̂`` > 0. (23) then gives U`(C`) = U`(Ch). Let C ′′` = σ̂``C` + σ̂`hCh with
Uh(Ch) ≥ Uh(C ′′` ),U`(C ′′` ) > U`(Ch) and Π`(C ′′` ) = σ̂``Π`(C`) + σ̂`hΠ`(Ch). C ′′` , Ch is
feasible in P3(λ, c, u0,Π0), with `-types choosing C ′′` and h-types choosing Ch. Since
U`(C ′′` ) > U`(C`) we get a contradiction. The same argument is valid when σ̂h` = 1.
Hence neither `-types nor h-types randomize at an optimal solution to P3(λ, c, u0,Π0).
This problem is then written as in part (i) of the Proposition by calling Ch the contract
chosen by h-types and C` the contract chosen by `-types: we then have σ̂hh = 1,
σ̂h` = 0, σ̂`` = 1 and σ̂`h = 0. Finally we check that (21) is satisfied in that case.
Let k0j = kj−Π0, x0j = xj+Π0 and C0j = (k0j , x0j ) for j = h or `. Let u0(W ) ≡ u(W −
Π0) with u0 = u0(WN −piA) and let U0j (k, x) ≡ (1−pij)u0(WN −k)+piju0(WA+x) for
j = h or `. P3(λ, c, u0,Π0) is then written as : choosing (C0h, C0` ) ∈ R4+ so as to maximize
U0` (C
0
` ) subject to (1 − λ)Π`(C0` ) + λΠh(C0h) ≥ 0, U0` (C0` ) ≥ U0` (C0h), U0h(C0` ) ≤ U0h(C0h)
and U0h(C
0
h) ≥ u0. This problem has a unique optimal solution which is characterized
as in part (ii) of the Proposition21.
(iii) is a consequence of the continuity of Φ3(λ, c, u0,Π0) - which itself follows from
the Maximum Theorem - and of the fact that given (27) and (28), there exists (C ′h, C
′
`)
21See Crocker and Snow (1985). The proof runs as follows. When u0 < u0, we delete the `-type
incentive constraint (27). Maximizing U`(C`) subject to the other constraints then gives an optimal
solution characterized as in the part (ii) of the Proposition, and (27) is satisfied for this solution.
Similarly, when u0 > u0, (28) is deleted and there is an optimal solution to the relaxed problem : it is
specified as in part (ii) of the Proposition and it satisfies (28).
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in a neighbourhood of (Ch, C`) such that U`(C ′`) > U`(C
′
h) and Uh(C
′
h) > Uh(C
′
`).
Proof of Corollary 1: We have Φ3(λ, c, U∗h , 0) ≥ U`(C∗∗` ) for all λ because C∗h, C∗∗`
is feasible in P3(λ, c, U∗h , 0). Note that Φ3 is continuous in λ from the Maximum Theorem.
Assume that λ is such that Φ3(λ, c, U∗h , 0) > U`(C
∗∗
` ). We then have Uh(Ch) > U
∗
h and
thus Πh(Ch) < 0. (26) then gives Π`(C`) > 0 which implies ∂Φ3(λ, c, u0, 0)/∂λ =
µ[Πh(Ch)−Π`(C`)] < 0 at any point of differentiability, where µ > 0 is a Kuhn-Tucker
multiplier associated with (26). We also have Φ3(0, c, U∗h , 0) = U`(C
∗
` ) > U`(C
∗∗
` ).
Hence there exists λ∗ in (0, 1] such that Φ3(λ, c, U∗h , 0) > U`(C
∗∗
` ) if 0 ≤ λ < λ∗ and
Φ3(λ, c, U∗h , 0) = U`(C
∗∗
` ) if λ
∗ ≤ λ ≤ 1.
It remains to show that λ∗ < 1. Assume that v ≡ Φ3(λ, c, U∗h , 0)− U`(C∗∗` ) > 0 and
let C` = (k`, x`), Ch = (kh, xh) be an optimal solution to P3(λ, c, U∗h , 0) with k` + x` <
A, kh + xh = A and kh = pihA with pih ≤ pih. Condition U`(C`) = U`(C∗∗` ) + v may
be equivalently written as k` = f(x`, v) where function f is such that ∂f/∂x` > 0,
∂2f/∂x2` < 0 and ∂f/∂v < 0. Condition x` + k` ≤ A is equivalent to x` ≤ x`(v)
where x`(v) is defined by x`(v) + f(x`(v)) = A, with x′`(v) > 0 and we have x
∗∗
` ≤
x` ≤ x∗` . Condition (28) is binding and gives pih = g(k`, x`) with g′1 > 0, g′2 < 0. Let
h(x`, v) ≡ g(f(x`, v), x`) and let Π˜(x`, v) be the expected profit after having substituted
k` = f(x`, v) and pih = h(x`, v) into the LHS of (26):
Π˜(x`, v) = (1− λ)[(1− pi`)f(x`, v)− pi`x`] + λ[h(x`, v)− pih]A < Π˜(x`, 0),
with Π˜(x∗∗` , 0) = 0. We have ∂Π˜(x`, 0)/∂x` < 0 for all x` in [x
∗∗
` , x
∗
` ] if
λ > λ ≡ (1− pi`)∂f(x
∗∗
` , 0)/∂x` − pi`
(1− pi`)∂f(x∗∗` , 0)/∂x` − pi` − h
′
A
∈ (0, 1),
where h′ = max{∂h(x`, 0)/∂x` | x` ∈ [x∗∗` , x∗` ]} < 0. Hence Π˜(x`, v) < 0 for all x` in
[x∗∗` , x
∗
` ] if v > 0 and λ > λ. Consequently v > 0 implies λ ≤ λ, which gives λ∗ ≤ λ < 1.
Corollary 2. Φ3(λ, c, u0,Π0) is decreasing in Π0, stationary in c and non-increasing in
u0. It is locally decreasing (respect. locally non-increasing) in λ if u0 > U0h(respect.=
U0h).
Proof : Let Ch, C` be the optimal solution to P3(λ, c, u0,Π0): it is characterized
in Proposition 1. For ε > 0, small enough, there exists C ′` in a neighbourhood of C`
such that U`(C ′`) > U`(C`), Uh(C
′
`) < Uh(C`) and (1 − λ)Π`(C ′`) + λΠh(Ch) ≥ Π0 − ε.
Hence Ch, C ′` is feasible in P3(λ, c, u0,Π0 − ε), which shows that Φ3(λ, c, u0,Π0 − ε) >
Φ3(λ, c, u0,Π0). Hence Φ3 is increasing in Π0. Obviously Φ3(λ, c, u0,Π0) is indepen-
dent from c and non-increasing in u0. Finally, at any point of differentiability, using
Proposition 1 and the Envelope Theorem gives ∂Φ3/∂λ = µ[Πh(Ch) − Π`(C`)] where
µ > 0 is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with (26). (ii) in Proposition 1 gives
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Πh(Ch) < (≤)Π0 when u0 > (=)U0h . Using (26) shows that Π`(C`) > (=)Π0 when
Πh(Ch) < (=)Π0 and 0 < λ < 1, hence the last result of the Corollary.
Definition 3. An allocation A feasible in Pi(λ, c, u0,Π0) is dominated in Pj(λ, c, u0,Π0)
by an allocation A′, for i, j ∈ {2, 3, 4}, if A′ is feasible in Pj(λ, c, u0,Π0) and if `-types
reach a higher expected utility at A′ than at A.
Lemma 4. Any allocation A = {Ch, C`, p̂, , σ̂hh, σ̂h`, σ̂`h, σ̂``}, σ̂`` < 1, feasible in
P4(λ, c, u0,Π0) is dominated in P2(λ, c, u0,Π0) by another allocation A′ = {C ′h, C ′`, p̂′, , σ̂′hh, σ̂′h`, σ̂′`h, σ̂′``}
such that σ̂′`` = 1.
Proof : Let A be a feasible allocation in P4(λ, c, u0,Π0) such that σ̂`` < 1.
1. Suppose first σ̂`` = 0, σ̂`h = 1, and thus U`(Ch) ≥ U`(C`). Using (20) gives x` = c.
Let k′` > k` such that Uh(k
′
`, c) = u0 ≤ Uh`(k`, c, p̂) and let C ′` = (k′`, c).
If σ̂h` = 1 or if σ̂h` ∈ (0, 1) and Πh(C ′`) ≥ Πh(Ch), then A1 = {C1h = Ch, C1` =
C ′`, p̂
1 = 0, σ̂1hh = 0, σ̂
1
h` = 1, σ̂
1
`h = 1, σ̂
1
`` = 0} is feasible in P3(λ, c, u0,Π0), with an
expected profit larger than Π0. Hence A1 is not optimal in P3(λ, c, u0,Π0), which implies
Φ3(λ, c, u0,Π0) > U`(Ch) ≥ Φ4(λ, c, u0,Π0). Proposition 1 then implies that there exists
a feasible allocation A′ with σ̂′`` = 1 that dominates A in P2(λ, c, u0,Π0).
If σ̂h` ∈ (0, 1) and Πh(C`) < Πh(Ch), then A2 = {C2h = Ch, C2` = (0, 0), p̂2 = 0, σ̂2hh =
1, σ̂2h` = 0, σ̂
2
`h = 1, σ̂
2
`` = 0} is feasible in P3(λ, c, u0,Π0), with an expected profit larger
than Π0, hence the same conclusion.
2. Suppose now σ̂``, σ̂`h ∈ (0, 1). (20) gives x` > c, σ̂h` = K(x`, λ, c)σ̂`` where
K(x, λ, c) is given by (31), which allows us to write (19) as
(1− λ)Π`(Ch) + λΠh(Ch) + (1− λ)σ̂``∆(Ch, C`) ≥ Π0, (56)
where ∆(Ch, C`) = Π`(C`)−Π`(Ch) + cpi`
pih(x` − c) [Πh(C`)−Πh(Ch)]. (57)
Consider first the case ∆(Ch, C`) > 0. If K(x`, λ, c) ≤ 1,then A3 = {C3h = Ch, C3` =
C`, p̂
3 = p̂, σ̂3hh = 1− σ̂3h`, σ̂3h` = K(x`, λ, c), σ̂3`h = 0, σ̂3`` = 1} is feasible in P4(λ, c, u0,Π0)
with the same expected utility for `-types and a larger expected profit, which shows that
A is dominated in P4(λ, c, u0,Π0) by an allocation such that σ̂`` = 1. If K(x`, λ, c) >
1, then A4 = {C4h = C`, C4` = Ch, p̂4 = 0, σ̂4hh = 1, σ̂4h` = 0, σ̂4`h = 1 − σ̂4``, σ̂4`` =
1/K(x`, λ, c)]} is feasible in P3(λ, c, u0,Π0) with the same expected utility for `-types.
We know from Proposition 1 that `-type individuals do not randomize at the optimum
of this problem. A4 is thus dominated in P3(λ, c, u0,Π0), hence the conclusion of the
Lemma.
Consider now the case ∆(Ch, C`) ≤ 0. Let us show thatA is dominated in P3(λ, c, u0,Π0).
Assume first σ̂h` < 1, which implies Uh(Ch) ≥ u0. (56) gives (1−λ)Π`(Ch)+λΠh(Ch) ≥
Π0 which shows that the allocation A5 where all individuals choose Ch is feasible in
P3(λ, c, u0,Π0) with the same expected utility for `-types. When u0 6= u0 or u0 = u0
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and Ch 6= C0 , then Proposition 1 shows that A5 is dominated in P3(λ, c, u0,Π0) by
a separating allocation A′ with σ̂′`` = 1. When u0 = u0 and Ch = C0, we have
λΠh(Ch)+(1−λ)Π`(Ch) = Π0 and (22), (23), 0 < σ̂`` < 1, σ̂h` > 0 and p̂ > 0 show that
U`(C`) = U`(Ch) and Uh(C`) > Uh(Ch). Using Ch = C0 then gives Π`(Ch) > Π`(C`)
and Πh(Ch) > Πh(C`), which implies
λ[σ̂hhΠh(Ch) + σ̂h`Πh(C`)] + (1− λ)[σ̂`hΠ`(Ch) + σ̂``Π`(C`)] < Π0,
which contradicts the fact that A is feasible in P4(λ, c, u0,Π0).
Assume now σ̂h` = 1. If Π`(C`) ≥ Π`(Ch), then A6 = {C6h = Ch, C6` = C`, p̂6 =
0, σ̂6hh = 0, σ̂
6
h` = 1, σ̂
6
`h = 0, σ̂
6
`` = 1} is feasible in P3(λ, c, u0,Π0) with unchanged
expected utility for `-types. If C` = C0, then (19) gives
λΠh(C0) + (1− λ)[σ̂`hΠ`(Ch) + σ̂``Π`(C0)] ≥ Π0,
which contradicts σ̂`h > 0 and Ch 6= C`. Hence C` 6= C0. Proposition 1-ii shows that
the pooling allocation A6 is not optimal in P3(λ, c, u0,Π0), hence the result. If Π`(C`) <
Π`(Ch) then A7 = {C7h = Ch, C7` = C`, p̂7 = 0, σ̂7hh = 0, σ̂7h` = 1, σ̂7`h = 1, σ̂7`` = 0} is
feasible in P3(λ, c, u0,Π0) with profit larger Π0: thus A7 is not an optimal solution to
this problem and the same result follows.
Proof of Proposition 2: Assume that A is feasible in P4(λ, c, u0,Π0) and not
dominated in P2(λ, c, u0,Π0). We know from Lemma 4 that σ̂`` = 1 which gives (32).
Furthermore (19)-(20) gives (30)-(31). (33) follows from σ̂h` > 0 and p̂ > 0 and (34)
holds if σ̂hh > 0. Ch is undetermined when σ̂hh = 0. W.l.o.g. A can be chosen such that
(34) hold. Conversely, if σ̂`` = 1 and σ̂h`, Ch, C` satisfy conditions (30) to (34), then A
is feasible in P4(λ, c, u0,Π0) with p̂ > 0 given by Uh`(C`, p̂) = Uh(Ch).
(i) Suppose that u0 ≥ u0. We know that Πh(C) ≤ (respect. <)(pi − pih)A + Π0 for
all C such that Uh(C) ≥ (respect. >)u0, with similar inequalities for `-types. Hence
σ̂hhΠh(Ch) + σ̂h`Πh(C`) < (pi − pih)A + Π0. (19) then gives Π`(C`) > (pi − pi`)A + Π0,
which implies U`(C`) < u0. One checks that Uh(C`) > u0 > U`(C`) implies k`+ x` > A.
Let C ′` = (k
′
`, x
′
`) such that k
′
`+x
′
` = A,U`(C
′
`) = U`(C`), which implies Π`(C
′
`) > Π`(C`)
and Uh(C`) > Uh(C ′`). Let C
′
h = C` if σ̂hh = 0 or if σ̂hh > 0 and Πh(Ch) ≤ Πh(C`)
and C ′h = Ch otherwise. Hence U`(C
′
`) ≥ U`(C ′h), Uh(C ′h) > Uh(C ′`) and Uh(C ′h) > u0.
Finally (19) yields
λΠh(C ′h) + (1− λ)Π`(C ′`) > λ[σ̂hhΠh(Ch) + σ̂h`Πh(C`)] + (1− λ)Π`(C`) = Π0.
Thus A1 = {C1h = C ′h, C1` = C ′`, p̂1 = 0, σ̂1hh = 1, σ̂1h` = 0, σ̂1`h = 0, σ̂1`` = 1} is feasible in
P3(λ, c, u0,Π0) with expected utility U`(C ′`) = U`(C`) and expected profit larger than
Π0. We deduce that A is dominated in P2(λ, c, u0,Π0), hence a contradiction.
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(ii) Proposition 1 gives Φ3(λ, c, u0,Π0) > u0 when u0 < u0. Given that Φ4(λ, c, u0,Π0) ≥
Φ3(λ, c, u0,Π0),we may thus restrict the constraint set of P4(λ, c, u0,Π0) by assuming
U`(C`) ≥ u0. Let us consider the maximization of U`(C`) with respect to Ch, C`, σ̂h`
subject to (30), (31),(34),U`(C`) ≥ u0 and Uh(C`) ≥ Uh(Ch). In words P4(λ, c, u0,Π0) is
modified by deleting (32), by writing (33) as a weak inequality and by adding U`(C`) ≥
u0. This maximization is denoted P4(λ, c, u0,Π0). It gives kh = A−xh =WN −u−1(u0)
and Πh(C`) ≤ Πh(Ch) = kh−pihA. (30) then gives Π`(C`) ≥ [Π0−λ(kh−pihA)]/(1−λ) ≡
Π`. Let S` ≡ {C` ∈ R2+ | Π`(C`) ≥ Π`, U`(C`) ≥ u0}. Note that S` is bounded. Fur-
thermore, given Ch = (WN − u−1(u0), A −WN + u−1(u0)), we have C` ∈ S` if C`, σ̂h`
is feasible in P4(λ, c, u0,Π0). The constraint set for C`, σ̂h` in P4(λ, c, u0,Π0) is thus
bounded when Ch is optimally chosen. Since this set is closed, we deduce that it is com-
pact and, given that U` is continuous, P4(λ, c, u0,Π0) has an optimal solution Ch, C`, σ̂h`
with Ch 6= C`. (32) is necessarily satisfied for this optimal solution, for otherwise we
would have U`(C`) < U`(Ch) = u0, hence a contradiction. Furthermore, (33) is not bind-
ing for otherwise A2 = {C2h = Ch, C2` = C`, p̂2 = 0, σ̂2hh = 1, σ̂2h` = 0, σ̂2`h = 0, σ̂2`` = 1}
would be feasible in P3(λ, c, u0,Π0) with positive profit (because Πh(C`) < Πh(Ch) from
(33) and Ch 6= C` ). A2 would not be optimal in in P3(λ, c, u0,Π0), which would con-
tradict Φ4(λ, c, u0,Π0) ≥ Φ3(λ, c, u0,Π0). We thus conclude that this optimal solution
is also an optimal solution to P4(λ, c, u0,Π0). It is such that σ̂h` < 1, for otherwise
A3 = {C3h = Ch, C3` = C`, p̂3 = 0, σ̂3hh = 0, σ̂3h` = 1, σ̂3`h = 0, σ̂3`` = 1} would be feasible,
but not optimal in P3(λ, c, u0,Π0) since u0 6= u0, hence once again a contradiction.
(iii) Using 0 < σ̂h` < 1 gives Uh`(C`, p̂) = Uh(Ch), with p̂ ∈ (0, 1) from (33). The
fact that Uh(Ch) = u0 < u0 < U`(C`) and kh+xh = A has been established in the proof
of part (ii). Assume Π0 = 0 and u0 = U∗h . We directly obtain Ch = C
∗
h. Furthermore,
substituting σ̂h` given by (31) into (30) gives k` ≥ φ(x`) with φ(x`) given by (35).
φ(x`) has a minimum at x` = 2c(pih − pi`)/pih(1 − pi`) ≡ xm, with φ(x`) → ∞ when
x` → xm/2 < c, φ(x`) ' pi`x`/(1−pi`) when x` →∞. and φ′′(x`) > 0 for all x` > xm/2.
Note also that φ′(x`) < pi`/(1−pi`) for all x` > xm/2. φ(x`) is drawn in Figure 4. When
A/c is large enough, as represented in Figure 4, the loci k` = φ(x`) and k` + x` = A
cross twice. In that case, PP ′ and the 45◦ degree line cross twice in the W1,W2 plane,
as represented in Figure 2. For small values of A/c, we have k` + x` > A on the whole
locus k` = φ(x`) and PP ′ is entirely above the 45◦ degree line. Maximizing U`(k`, x`)
subject to k` = φ(x`) gives
−∂U`(k`, x`)/∂x`
∂U`(k`, x`)/∂k`
=
pi`u
′(WA + x`)
(1− pi`)u′(WN − k`) = φ
′(x`) <
pi`
1− pi` ,
which implies u′(WA+x`) < u′(WN − k`). Using u′′ < 0 then gives WA+x` > WN − k`
or k` + x` > WN −WA = A.
Figure 4
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(iv) follows from the continuity of 4(λ, c, u0,Π0) in u0 and Π0 and from the fact
that given (33) and (34), there exists (C ′h, C
′
`) in a neighbourhood of (Ch, C`) such that
U`(C ′`) > U`(C
′
h) and Uh(C
′
`) > Uh(C
′
h).
Corollary 3. At any point where Φ4(λ, c, u0,Π0) > Φ3(λ, c, u0,Π0), Φ4 is locally de-
creasing in Π0, c and u0. Furthermore Φ4 is locally decreasing (respect. stationary,
locally increasing) in λ if u0 > U0h (respect = U
0
h , < U
0
h).
Proof: Let λ, c, u0,Π0 such that Φ4(λ, c, u0,Π0) > Φ3(λ, c, u0,Π0) and let Ch, C`
be a pair of optimal contracts in P4(λ, c, u0,Π0). The fact that Φ4 is locally decreasing
in Π0 follows from Proposition 2 with the same kind of argument as for Φ3in Corollary
1. Furthermore, we know from Proposition 2 that 0 < σ̂h` < 1 and Uh(Ch) = u0
at an optimal solution to P4(λ, c, u0,Π0), which gives ∂Φ4/∂u0 < 0 at any point of
differentiability. Using the Enveloppe Theorem gives
∂Φ4(λ, c, u0,Π0)
∂c
= µ[Πh(C`)−Πh(Ch)] (1− λ)cpi`
pih(x` − c)2 < 0,
∂Φ4(λ, c, u0,Π0)
∂λ
= −µ[Π`(C`)+ cpi`
pih(x` − c)Πh(C`)]+µ
pihx` − c(pih − pi`)
pih(x` − c) Πh(Ch), (58)
at any point of differentiability, with µ > 0 a Kuhn-Tucker multiplier. Proposition
2-iii gives Πh(Ch) < (=, >)Π0 when u0 > (=, <)U0h . (30), (31) and (58) then yield
∂Φ4(λ, c, u0,Π0)/∂λ < (=, >)0 when u0 > (=, <)U0h .
Corollary 4. Φ2 is decreasing in Π0, non-increasing in u0 and c and locally decreasing
(respect. locally non-increasing) in λ if u0 > U0h (respect. u0 ≥ U0h).
Proof : Corollary 4 is a direct consequence of Corollaries 2 and 3.
Let P˜j(λ, c, u0,Π0) be the same maximization problem as Pj(λ, c, u0,Π0) with j = 2, 3
or 4, up to the difference that (24) is written as an equality instead of an inequality and
let Φ˜j(λ, c, u0,Π0) be the corresponding value function with Φ˜j ≤ Φj .
Lemma 5. (i) Φ˜2 and Φ˜3 are decreasing in Π0,
(ii) Φ˜2 and Φ˜3 are decreasing (respect. stationary, increasing) in λ if and only if
u0 > U
0
h (respect. u0 = U
0
h , u0 < U
0
h),
(iii) Φ˜3(0, c, u0,Π0) < (respect.=)Φ˜3(λ, c, u0,Π0) for all λ ∈ (0, 1] if u0 < U0h(respect.=
U0h),
(iv) Φ˜3(0, c, u0,Π0) is locally increasing in u0 if u0 < u(WN − pi`A).
Proof : (i) can be proved in the same way as the equivalent property for Φ3 in
Corollary 2. When u0 < u0 the optimal solution to P˜3(λ, c, u0,Π0) is such that kh+xh =
A with Πh(Ch) > (respect.=, <)Π0 if u0 < (respect.=, >)U0h . (ii) can then be proved
in the same way as the equivalent property for Φ3 in Corollary 2. (iii) and (iv) are
obvious.
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Lemma 6. An optimal solution to P˜2(λ, c, U∗h , 0) is characterized by Ch = C∗h, C` =
C∗∗` , σ̂hh = 1, σ̂h` = 0, σ̂`h = 0, σ̂`` = 1 if U`(C
∗∗
` ) ≥ U`(Ĉ`) and Ch = C∗h, C` =
Ĉ`, σ̂h` = K(x̂`, λ, c) ∈ (0, 1], σ̂hh = 1 − σ̂h`, σ̂`h = 0, σ̂`` = 1 if U`(C∗∗` ) ≤ U`(Ĉ`),
where Ĉ` = (k̂`, x̂`) is defined as in Proposition 3.
Proof : The Lemma straighforwardly follows from Φ˜2 = inf{Φ˜3, Φ˜4} and from the
fact that Ch = C∗h, C` = C
∗∗
` , σ̂hh = 1, σ̂h` = 0, σ̂`h = 0, σ̂`` = 1 is an optimal solution
to P˜3(λ, c, U∗h , 0) and Ch = C∗h, C` = Ĉ`, σ̂h` = K(x̂`, λ, c) ∈ (0, 1], σ̂hh = 1 − σ̂h`, σ̂`h =
0, σ̂`` = 1 is an optimal solution to P˜4(λ, c, U∗h , 0).
Let us consider problem P˜1(λ, c, u0,Π00, ...,Πn0 ), with value function Φ˜1(λ, c, u0,Π00, ...,Πn0 ),
which is analogous to P̂1(λ, c, u0,Π10, ...,Πn0 ) except that C0h, C0` and p0 can be freely cho-
sen (C0h and C
0
` are no more necessarily equal to (0, 0) and p
0 is no more necessarily equal
to 0) and (37), (38) and (39) should hold also for i = 0. Of course, C0h = C
0
` = (0, 0), p
0 =
0 is possible in P˜1, and we thus have Φ˜1(λ, c, u0,Π00, ...,Πn0 ) ≥ Φ1(λ, c, u0,Π10, ...,Πn0 ),
where Φ1 is the value function of P̂1.
Lemma 7. (i) Φ˜1(λ, c, u0, 0, ..., 0) = Φ2(λ, c, u0, 0) for all λ, c, u0.
(ii) Φ˜1(λ, c, u0,Π0, ...,Π0) < Φ2(λ, c, u0,Π0) for all Π0 > 0 and all λ, c, u0.
Proof : Let {Ch, C`, p̂, , σ̂hh, σ̂h`, σ̂`h, σ̂``} be an optimal solution to P2(λ, c, u0, 0).
Then {Ci = (Ch, C`), pi = p̂, N i = 1/(n + 1), λi = λ, σ̂ihh = σ̂hh, σ̂ih` = σ̂h`, σ̂i`h =
σ̂`h, σ
i
`` = σ̂`` for all i = 0, ..., n} is feasible in P˜1(λ, c, u0, 0, ..., 0), which implies
Φ˜1(λ, c, u0, 0, ..., 0) ≥ Φ2(λ, c, u0, 0). (59)
Let A = (A0, ...,An) with Ai = {Cih, Ci`, pi, N i, λi, σ̂ihh, σ̂ih`, σ̂i`h, σ̂i`` } be an optimal
solution to P˜1(λ, c, u0,Π0, ...,Π0) with Π0 > 0 and let ui0 = max{Uh(Cih), Uh`(Ci`, pi)} for
i = 0, ..., n, with ui0 ≥ u0 if N iλi > 0. Note that σ̂ihh and σ̂ih` are indeterminate if N iλi =
0 : in such a case, we choose σ̂ihh and σ̂
i
h` such that σ̂
i
hhUh(C
i
h) + σ̂
i
h`Uh`(C
i
`, p
i) = ui0.
Note also that Π0 > 0 gives 0 < N i < 1 for all i = 0, ..., n.
Case 1: λi ∈ {0, 1} for all i = 0, ..., n.
For all i such that λi = 1, we necessarily have u0 ≤ ui0 ≤ u(W − pihA − Π0N i ) since
otherwise (37),(40) and (42) would be incompatible. Using Π0 > 0 and N i < 1 then
implies u0 < U0h .
For all i such that λi = 0,we have Φ˜1(λ, c, u0,Π0, ...,Π0) = σ̂i`hU`(C
i
h) + σ̂
i
``U`(C
i
`)
and (38) gives pi = 0. Hence Ai is feasible in P˜3(0, c, ui0, Π0N i ), which gives
Φ˜3(0, c, ui0,
Π0
N i
) ≥ Φ˜1(λ, c, u0,Π0, ...,Π0). (60)
We also have ui0 ≤ uj0 if λj = 1 and thus ui0 ≤ u(WN − pihA− Π0Nj ) < U0h .
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If ui0 ≤ u0, we can write
Φ˜3(0, c, ui0,
Π0
N i
) < Φ˜3(0, c, ui0,Π0) from Π0 > 0, 0 < N
i < 1 and Lemma 5-i,
≤ Φ˜3(0, c, u0,Π0) from ui0 ≤ u0 ≤ U0h < u(WN − pi`A) and Lemma 5-iv,
≤ Φ˜3(λ, c, u0,Π0) from Lemma 5-iii,
≤ Φ2(λ, c, u0,Π0) from the definition of Φ2 and Φ˜3.
and (60) finally yields
Φ2(λ, c, u0,Π0) > Φ˜1(λ, c, u0,Π0, ...,Π0). (61)
If ui0 > u0, we can write
Φ˜3(0, c, ui0,
Π0
N i
) < Φ˜3(0, c, ui0,Π0) from Π0 > 0, 0 < N
i < 1 and Lemma 5-i,
≤ Φ˜3(λ, c, ui0,Π0) from ui0 ≤ U0h and Lemma 5-iii,
≤ Φ3(λ, c, ui0,Π0) from the definitions of Φ3 and Φ˜3,
≤ Φ3(λ, c, u0,Π0) from ui0 > u0,
≤ Φ2(λ, c, u0,Π0) from the definitions of Φ2 and Φ3,
which also leads to (61).
Case 2: There exists i ∈ {0, ..., n} such that 0 < λi < 1 and N i > 0.
Let u′0 = max{u00, ..., un0}, with u′0 ≥ u0. For all i such that 0 < λi < 1 and N i > 0,
we have ui0 = u
′
0 and
Φ˜2(λi, c, u′0,Π0) > Φ˜2(λ
i, c, u′0,
Π0
N i
) ≥ Φ˜1(λ, c, u0,Π0, ...,Π0). (62)
Note that the second inequality in (62) is a consequence ofAi beeing feasible in P˜2(λi, c, ui0, Π0N i )
and Φ˜1(λ, c, u0,Π0, ...,Π0) = σ̂i`hU`(C
i
h) + σ̂
i
``U`(C
i
`) when N
i > 0 and 0 < λi < 1.
For all i such that λi = 1 and N i > 0, we have ui0 = u
′
0 ≤ u(W − pihA− Π0N i ) < U0h .
Hence, if there exists i such that λi = 1 and N i > 0, then Lemma 5-ii gives
Φ˜2(1, c, u′0,Π0) > Φ˜2(λ
j , c, u′0,Π0) for all j such that 0 < λ
j < 1,
and (62) yields
Φ˜2(1, c, u′0,Π0) > Φ˜1(λ, c, u0,Π0, ...,Π0). (63)
Suppose that
Φ˜2(0, c, u′0,Π0) ≤ Φ˜1(λ, c, u0,Π0, ...,Π0). (64)
(62) and (64) give Φ˜2(0, c, u′0,Π0) < Φ˜2(λi, c, u′0,Π0) for all i such that 0 < λi < 1, N i > 0
and Lemma 5-ii gives u′0 < U0h . Suppose in addition that there exists i such that λ
i = 0
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andN i > 0. If σ̂i`` > 0, we have p
i = 0 from (38) and thusAi is feasible in P˜3(0, c, ui0, Π0N i ).
Furthermore Φ1(λ, c, u0,Π0, ...,Π0) = σ̂i`hU`(C
i
h) + σ̂
i
``U`(C
i
`) when N
i > 0 and λi < 1.
Hence
Φ˜3(0, c, ui0,Π0) > Φ˜3(0, c, u
i
0,
Π0
N i
) ≥ Φ˜1(λ, c, u0,Π0, ...,Π0), (65)
and
Φ˜3(0, c, ui0,Π0) ≤ Φ˜3(0, c, u′0,Π0) from ui0 ≤ u′0 < U0h < u(WN − pi`A) and Lemma 5-iv,
≤ Φ˜2(0, c, u′0,Π0) from the definitions of Φ2 and Φ˜3. (66)
(65) and (66) imply Φ˜1(λ, c, u0,Π0, ...,Π0) < Φ˜2(0, c, u′0,Π0), which contradicts (64).
Hence if there exists i such that λi = 0 and N i > 0, we have
Φ˜2(0, c, u′0,Π0) > Φ˜1(λ, c, u0,Π0, ...,Π0). (67)
(62),(63) and (67) show that Φ˜2(λi, c, u′0,Π0) ≥ Φ˜1(λ, c, u0,Π0, ...,Π0) for all i such that
N i > 0. Using (43) and the fact that Φ˜2 is monotonic in λ (as shown in Lemma 5-ii)
gives
Φ˜2(λ, c, u′0,Π0) > Φ˜1(λ, c, u0,Π0, ...,Π0). (68)
Since u′0 ≥ u0 and Φ2 is non-increasing in u0, we can write
Φ2(λ, c, u0,Π0) ≥ Φ2(λ, c, u′0,Π0) ≥ Φ˜2(λ, c, u′0,Π0), (69)
and (68) and (69) imply (61), this inequality beeing valid when Π0 > 0. This is part (ii)
of the Lemma. The computations are unchanged when Π0 = 0 with weak inequalities
instead of strong inequalities and (61) is still valid with ≥ instead of >. (59) and (61)
written as a weak inequality together give part (i) of the Lemma.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Consider problem P˜1(λ, c, u0, 0, ..., 0) and let ui0 and u′0 be defined as in the Propo-
sition.
1. Assume first u′0 > U∗h . Let i such that N
i > 0. In that case (37) and (42) imply
λi < 1, which gives Φ˜1(λ, c, u′0, 0, ..., 0) = σ̂i`hU`(C
i
h) + σ̂
i
``U`(C
i
`). Furthermore, if λ
i > 0
then{Ci, pi, σ̂ihh, σ̂ih`, σ̂i`h, σ̂i``} is feasible in P˜2(λi, c, u′0, 0). Hence if λi > 0, we have
Φ˜2(λi, c, u′0, 0) ≥ Φ˜1(λ, c, u′0, 0, ..., 0),
= Φ2(λ, c, u′0, 0) from Lemma 7-i,
≥ Φ˜2(λ, c, u′0, 0) from the definition of Φ2 and Φ˜2.
Since u′0 > U∗h , Lemma 5-ii then implies λ
i ≤ λ. Since this inequality should hold for
all i such that N i > 0, (43) allows us to deduce that λi = λ for all i such that N i > 0.
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2. Assume now u′0 < U∗h (which implies u0 < U
∗
h). Let i such that N
i > 0. The
same argument as in the case u′0 > U∗h yields λ
i ≥ λ if 0 < λi < 1. Suppose that λi = 0.
We have
Φ˜3(0, c, u′0, 0) ≥ Φ˜3(0, c, ui0, 0) from ui0 ≤ u′0 < U∗h < u(WN − pi`A) and Lemma 5-iv,
≥ Φ˜1(λ, c, u0, 0, ..., 0), (70)
because {Ci, pi, σ̂ihh, σ̂ih`, σ̂i`h, σ̂i``}, is feasible in P˜3(0, c, ui0, 0) and Φ˜1(λ, c, u0, 0, ..., 0) =
σ̂i`hU`(C
i
h) +σ̂
i
``U`(C
i
`) when N
i > 0 and λi = 0. Using
Φ˜1(λ, c, u0, 0, ..., 0) = Φ2(λ, c, u0, 0) from Lemma 7-i,
≥ Φ˜2(λ, c, u′0, 0) from the definition of Φ˜2 and u′0,
≥ Φ˜3(λ, c, u′0, 0) from the definition of Φ˜3, (71)
(70) and (71) give Φ˜3(0, c, u′0, 0) ≥ Φ˜3(λ, c, u′0, 0) which contradicts Lemma 5-iii because
u′0 < U∗h . Hence, we have λ
i ≥ λ if N i > 0. Using (43) gives λi = λ for all i such that
N i > 0.
3. When u′0 6= U∗h , using λi = λ for all i such that N i > 0 allows us to write
σ̂i`hU`(C
i
h) + σ̂
i
``U`(C
i
`) = Φ˜1(λ, c, u0, 0, ..., 0) = Φ2(λ, c, u0, 0),
if N i > 0 and since {Ci, pi, σ̂ihh, σ̂ih`, σ̂i`h, σ̂i``} is feasible in P2(λ, c, u0, 0), we conclude
that it is an optimal solution to this problem.
4. Assume u′0 = U∗h . If 0 < λ
i < 1 and N i > 0, we have Φ˜1(λ, c, U∗h , 0, ..., 0) =
σ̂i`hU`(C
i
h) + σ̂
i
``U`(C
i
`) and U
∗
h = u
i
0. Thus {Ci, pi, σ̂ihh, σ̂ih`, σ̂i`h, σ̂i``} is feasible in
P˜2(λi, c, U∗h , 0).
Φ˜1(λ, c, U∗h , 0, ..., 0) = Φ2(λ, c, U
∗
h , 0) from Lemma 7-i,
≥ Φ˜2(λ, c, U∗h , 0) from the definition of Φ˜2,
= Φ˜2(λi, c, U∗h , 0) from Lemma 5-ii.
Hence {Ci, pi, σ̂ihh, σ̂ih`, σ̂i`h, σ̂i``} is the optimal solution to P˜2(λi, c, U∗h , 0), which is char-
acterized in Lemma 6. If λi = 0 and N i > 0, then {Ci, pi, σ̂ihh, σ̂ih`, σ̂i`h, σ̂i``} is feasible
in P˜2(0, c, ui0, 0), with ui0 ≤ U∗h . Suppose ui0 < U∗h . Then
Φ˜2(0, c, ui0, 0) ≥ σ̂i`hU`(Cih) + σ̂i``U`(Ci`),
= Φ˜1(λ, c, U∗h , 0, ..., 0) because N
i > 0, λi = 0,
= Φ2(λ, c, U∗h , 0) from Lemma 7-i,
≥ Φ˜2(λ, c, U∗h , 0) from the definition of Φ˜2,
= Φ˜2(0, c, U∗h , 0) from Lemma 5-ii,
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which contradicts Lemma 5-iv. Using u′0 = U∗h and u
i
0 ≥ U∗h then gives ui0 = U∗h . Hence
{Ci, pi, σ̂ihh, σ̂ih`, σ̂i`h, σ̂i``} is optimal in P˜2(0, c, U∗h , 0) and is characterized as in Lemma
6. Finally if N i > 0 and λi = 1, then the feasibility constraints in P˜1(1, c, U∗h , 0, ..., 0)
imply Cih = C
∗
h and σ̂
i
hh = 1.
5. Thus far we have characterized the optimal solution to P˜1(λ, c, u0, 0, ..., 0). For this
optimal solution the `-types’expected utility is larger or equal to U ` if Φ2(λ, c, u0, 0) ≥ U `
or equivalently if u0 ≤ û0(λ, c). In such a case, the optimal solution to P̂1(λ, c, u0, 0, ..., 0)
involves N0 = 0 and it is characterized as in the Proposition, since problem P̂1 with
N0 = 0 is equivalent to problem P˜1 (there are n insurers in P̂1 and n + 1 insurers
in P˜1, but the number of insurers do not affect the characterization of the optimal
solution). When u0 > û0(λ, c), then P̂1(λ, c, u0, 0, ..., 0) has no feasible solution. In-
deed assume Φ2(λ, c, u0, 0) < U `. If P̂1(λ, c, u0, 0, ..., 0) has a feasible solution then
Φ1(λ, c, u0, 0, ..., 0) ≥ U `, which implies Φ˜1(λ, c, u0, 0, ..., 0) ≥ U `. Lemma 7-i then gives
Φ2(λ, c, u0, 0) ≥ U `, hence a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 3 : Let Γ be the continuation subgame after C˜ was offered at
stage 2. Consider a perturbed continuation subgame Γε, where mixed strategies are
constrained by pi ∈ [ε, 1 − ε] for all i, σh ∈ S˜2n+1ε , σ` ∈ S˜2n+1ε , with S˜2n+1ε = {t =
(t1, ..., t2n+2) ∈ S2n+1, tj ≥ ε for all j = 1, ..., 2n + 2} and ε > 0. Γε is derived from
Γ by requiring that each player chooses each pure strategy with at least some minimal
positive probability ε22, with Γ ≡ Γ0. {p, σh, σ`, µ} is a trembling hand perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of Γ if it is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of Γ and if there is some sequence
of perturbed games {Γεm}∞m=1 that converges to Γ [in the sense that εm > 0 for all m
and limm→∞ εm = 0] for which there is some associated sequence of perfect Bayesian
equilibria {pm, σhm, σ`m, µm} such that {pm, σhm, σ`m} converges to {p, σh, σ`} when
m→∞.
Let’s get to the proof of the Lemma. {p, σh, σ`} is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
of Γ. Assume it is trembling hand perfect and consider a sequence of perturbed games
{Γεm}∞m=1 that converges to Γ and an associated sequence of perfect Bayesian equilibria
{pm, σhm, σ`m, µm} such that {pm, σhm, σ`m} converges to {p, σh, σ`}. Bayes law gives
gives
µim ≡
λpihσ
i
h`m
λpihσ
i
h`m + (1− λ)pi`σi``m
∈ (0, 1) for all m.
Minimizing pi(µimx˜
i
` − c) with respect to pi ∈ [εm, 1 − εm] implies pim = εm for all m if
x˜i` = c. Using limm→∞ εm = 0 then gives limm→∞ εm = 0p
i = 0 if x˜i` = c.
Lemma 8. For any equilibrium E = {C˜, p˜(.), σ˜h(.), σ˜`(.), µ˜(.)} and for all C such that
Uh(Ci`) > max{Uh(Cjh), j = 1, ..., n;Uh`(Cj` , p˜j(C)), j = 1, ..., n and j 6= i} > Uh,
22For notational simplicity, we suppose that this minimal probability ε is the same for all players and
all pure strategies.
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(i) If xi` > c and σ˜
i
``(C) > 0, then
σ˜ih`(C) = min{1, σ˜i``(C)K(xi`, λ, c)},
p˜i(C) = φi(C) (resp. = 0,∈ [0, φi(C))) if σ˜i``(C)K(xi`, λ, c) < 1(resp. > 1,= 1).
(ii) If xi` > c and σ˜
i
``(C) = 0, then σ˜
i
h`(C) = 0 and p˜
i(C) ∈ [φi(C), 1].
(iii) If xi` = c and σ˜
i
``(C) > 0, then σ˜
i
h`(C) = 1 and p˜
i(C) = 0.
(iv) If xi` = c, and σ˜
i
``(C) = 0, then σ˜
i
h`(C) = 1, p˜
i(C) < φi(C) or σ˜ih`(C) ∈
[0, 1], p˜i(C) = φi(C) or σ˜ih`(C) = 0, p˜
i(C) > φi(C).
(v) If xi` < c then σ˜
i
h`(C) = 1 and p˜
i(C) = 0,
where K(x, λ, c) and φi(C) ∈ (0, 1) are respectively given by (31) and by
Uh`(Ci`, φ
i(C)) = max{Uh(Cjh), j = 1, ..., n;Uh`(Cj` , p˜j(C)), j = 1, ..., n and j 6= i}.
Proof : Consider the case where xi` > c and σ˜
i
``(C) > 0. (3), (5) and (7) show that
σih` ≡ σ˜ih`(C), σi`` ≡ σ˜i``(C)and pi ≡ p˜i(C) are linked by the reaction functions of the h-
type individuals and of insurer i, which are σih` = 1 (resp.∈ [0, 1],= 0) if pi < φi(C) (resp.
pi = φi(C), pi > φi(C)) and pi = 1 (resp.∈ [0, 1],= 0) if σih` > σi``K(xi`, λ, c) (resp.
σih` = σ
i
``K(x
i
`, λ, c), σ
i
h` < σ
i
``K(x
i
`, λ, c)). These reaction functions are illustrated in
Figure 5, with σ˜ih`(C) = σ˜
i
``(C)K(x
i
`, λ, c) and p˜
i(C) = φi(C). The results are similarly
obtained in the other cases.
Figure 5
Proof of Proposition 5
Step 1 of the proof shows that under THP any equilibrium allocation is an optimal
solution to P1(λ,U eh, 0, ..., 0) and Step 2 establishes that U eh ≤ U∗h , with U eh = U∗h if SDS
is supposed in addition.
Step 1
Let {C˜, p, σh, σ`} be an equilibrium allocation that satisfies THP, with C˜, p˜(.), σ˜h(.), σ˜`(.)
the profile of strategies and µ˜(.) the system of beliefs. {C˜, p, σh, σ`}is feasible in P1(λ, c, U eh,
Π1, ...,Πn). Because Πi ≥ 0, we deduce that {C˜, p, σh, σ`}is feasible in P1(λ, c, U eh, 0, ..., 0).
Assume that this equibrium allocation is not an optimal solution to P1(λ, c, U eh, 0, ..., 0).
Then using Lemma 7-i allows us to write
max{U`(C˜ih), U`(C˜i`), i = 1, ..., n} < Φ˜1(λ, c, U eh, 0, ..., 0) = Φ2(λ, c, U eh, 0).
Consider a deviation by an insurer i0 from C˜i0 = (C˜i0h , C˜
i0
` ) to C
i0 = (Ci0h , C
i0
` )
and let p˜i ≡ p˜i(Ci0 , C˜−i0), µ˜i ≡ µ˜i(Ci0 , C˜−i0), σ˜ijk ≡ σ˜ijk(Ci0 , C˜−i0) for (j, k) ∈ {h, `}2.
Let also Π˜i0 be the profit of insurer i0 at the continuation equilibrium following the
deviation. Hence Πi0 and Π˜i0 are respectively the LHS and the RHS of (6) for i = i0.
Case 1: There exists i0 ∈ {1, ..., n} such that Πi0 = 0.
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Propositions 1-iii and 2-iv show that there exists {Ci0 , p̂, σ̂hh, σ̂h`, σ̂`h, σ̂``} feasible
in P2(λ, c, U eh+ε, ε′), with ε, ε′ > 0, and such that σ̂`` = 1, U`(C
i0
` ) > U`(C
i0
h ), Uh(C
i0
h ) 6=
Uh(Ci0` ), Uh(C
i0
h ) ≥ U eh + ε, U`(Ci0` ) ≥ Φ2(λ, c, U eh, 0)− η and
0 < η < Φ2(λ, c, U eh, 0)−max{U`(C˜ih), U`(C˜i`), i = 1, ..., n}.
Hence U`(Ci0` ) > max{U`(C˜ih), U`(C˜i`), i = 1, ..., n; i 6= i0} and thus σ˜i0`` = 1. Let i 6= i0
such that pi > 0. Lemmas 1 and 3 then imply x˜i` > c. When σ˜
i
h` > 0, we have µ˜
i = 1
and (5) gives p˜i = 1. We thus have p˜i ≥ pi and max{Uh(C˜ih), Uh`(C˜i`, p˜i), i = 1, ..., n; i 6=
i0} ≤ U eh for all i 6= i0 such that σ˜ih` > 0. Uh(Ci0h ) ≥ U eh + ε then implies σ˜i0hh + σ˜i0h` = 1.
Case 1.1: Uh(Ci0` ) > Uh(C
i0
h ). Let ϕ ∈ (0, 1) such that Uh`(Ci0` , ϕ) = Uh(Ci0h ).
Suppose xi0` ≤ c. Then (20) and σ̂`` = 1 show that p̂ = 0 and (22) gives σ̂h` = 1.
Hence the profit of insurer i0 is larger or equal to ε′ when all individuals choose Ci0` .
Furthermore, using σ˜i0`` = 1 and Lemma 8 gives p˜
i0 = 0, σ˜i0h` = 1. We get Π˜
i0 ≥ ε′ > Πi0 ,
hence a contradiction with (6).
Suppose now xi0` > c and let K0 ≡ K(xi0` , λ, c) > 0.
If K0 < 1: Suppose p̂ = 0. Using σ̂`` = 1 and (21) then gives σ̂h` ≤ K0 and thus
σ̂h` < 1. (22) then implies p̂ ≥ ϕ > 0, which is a contradiction. Hence p̂ > 0 and (20)
yields σ̂h` = K0 ∈ (0, 1) and (22) gives p̂ = ϕ. Lemma 8 then yields σ˜i0h` = σ̂h` and
σ˜i0hh = σ̂hh.
If K0 > 1: A similar argument gives p˜i0 = p̂ = 0 and σ˜i0h` = σ̂h` = 1.
If K0 = 1: We obtain σ̂h` = 1 and p̂ ∈ [0, ϕ]. There is a continuum of continuation
equilibria defined by σ˜i0h` = 1, p˜
i0 ∈ [0, ϕ].
Case 1.2: In the case Uh(Ci0` ) < Uh(C
i0
h ), we have p˜
i0 = p̂ = 0, σ˜i0hh = σ̂hh = 1 and
σ˜i0`` = σ̂`` = 1.
In Cases 1.1 and 1.2, we get Π˜i0 ≥ ε′ > Πi0 , hence a contradiction with (6).
Case 2: Πi > 0 for all i = 1, ..., n.
Let i0 ∈ {1, ..., n} such that 0 < Πi0 ≤ Πi for all i. Since{C˜, p, σh, σ`} is feasible in
P1(λ, c, U eh,Π
1
, ...,Πn), we have
max{U`(C˜ih), U`(C˜i`), i = 1, ..., n} ≤ Φ˜1(λ, c, U eh,Π1, ...,Πn).
∂Φ˜1/∂Πi0 ≤ 0, ∂Φ2/∂Π0 > 0 and Lemma 7-ii then show that there exists δ > 0 such
that
max{U`(C˜ih), U`(C˜i`), i = 1, ..., n} < Φ2(λ, c, U eh,Πi0 + δ).
Note that σi0hh+σ
i0
h` < 1 and/or σ
i0
`h+σ
i0
`` < 1 for otherwise we would have Πi = 0 for all
i 6= i0. Propositions 1-iii and 2-iv show that for all η > 0, we can find ε > 0 such that
{Ci0 , p̂, σ̂hh, σ̂h`, σ̂`h, σ̂``} is an optimal solution to P2(λ, c, U eh + ε,Π
i0 + δ), U`(Ci0` ) >
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U`(Ci0h ), U`(C
i0
` ) ≥ Φ2(λ, c, U eh + ε,Π
i0 + δ)− η. Let η such that
0 < η < Φ2(λ, c, U eh,Π
i0 + δ)−max{U`(C˜ih), U`(C˜i`), i = 1, ..., n}.
The same argument as in Case 1 shows σ˜i0`` = σ̂`` = 1, σ˜
i0
hh = σ̂hh and σ˜
i0
h` = σ̂h`, which
gives Π˜i0 = Πi0 + δ, hence a contradiction with (6).
Step 2
Suppose U eh 6= U∗h . Since {C˜, p, σh, σ`} is an optimal solution to P1(λ, c, U eh, 0, .., 0),
we know from Proposition 4 (with u0 = u′0 = U eh) that for all i such that N
i
> 0, then
Ai ≡ {C˜i, pi, σ̂ihh, σ̂ih`, σ̂i`h, σ̂i``} is an optimal solution to P2(λ, c, U eh, 0), where σ̂ihh, σ̂ih`
... are deduced from σh, σ` as in P̂1(λ, c, U eh, 0, .., 0). We also know that Πi = 0 for all
i because (19) is binding at an optimal solution to P2(λ, c, U eh, 0). Finally, Propositions
1, 2 and 4 show that σi`h = 0 and that σ
i
`` = σ
i
hh + σ
i
h` for all i such that N
i
> 0.
Case 1′: U eh > U
∗
h .
Case 1′.1: σihh > 0 for all i such that N
i
> 0.
Let i0 such that N
i0 > 0. Using U eh > U
∗
h gives Πh(C˜
i0
h ) < 0. Then (19) - written for
Ai0 with Π0 = 0 - gives Π`(C˜i0` ) > 0.
Suppose first that pi0 = 0, which implies thatAi0 is an optimal solution to P3(λ, c, U eh, 0)
and thus σi0hh = σ
i
`` = 1. If there exists i1 6= i0 such that N
i1 > 0, let Ci0h = (0, 0) and
Ci0` such that U`(C
i0
` ) > U`(C˜
i0
` ) and Uh(C
i0
` ) < Uh(C˜
i0
` ), which implies σ˜
i0
`` = 1 and
σ˜i0h` = 0
23. For Ci0` close enough to C˜
i0
` , we have
Π˜i0 = (1− λ)Π`(Ci0` ) > λΠh(C˜i0h ) + (1− λ)Π`(C˜i0` ) = Πi0 = 0,
which contradicts (6). If N i = 0 for all i 6= i0, choose the same deviation as above but
for i1 6= i0, which gives Π˜i1 > Πi1 = 0, hence a contradiction once again.
Suppose now pi0 > 0, i.e. Ai0 is an optimal solution to P4(λ, c, U eh, 0), which implies
x˜i0` > c. Choose C
i0
h = (0, 0) and C
i0
` such that x
i0
` > x˜
i0
` and U`(C
i0
` ) > U`(C˜
i0
` ), which
gives σ˜i0`` = 1. Using (31) gives K(x
i0
` , λ, c) < K(x˜
i0
` , λ, c) = σ̂
i0
h` ≤ 1. Lemma 8 then
gives σ˜i0h` = K(x
i0
` , λ, c). We have
λ[σ̂i0hhΠh(C˜
i0
h ) + σ̂
i0
h`Πh(C˜
i0
` )] + (1− λ)Π`(C˜i0` ) = Π
i0/N
i0 = 0. (72)
Using U eh > U
∗
h and σ̂
i0
hh > 0 gives Πh(C˜
i0
h ) < 0. Hence (72) and σ̂
i0
h` = K(x˜
i0
` , λ, c) yield
λK(x˜i0` , λ, c)Πh(C˜
i0
` ) + (1− λ)Π`(C˜i0` ) > 0. Thus
Π˜i0 = λσ˜i0h`Πh(C
i0
` )+(1−λ)σ˜i0``Π`(Ci0` ) = λK(xi0` , λ, c)Πh(Ci0` )+(1−λ)Π`(Ci0` ) > 0 = Π
i0 ,
for Ci0` close enough to C˜
i0
` , hence a contradiction.
23Note that σi0hh > 0 and p
i0 = 0 give Uh( eCi0h ) ≥ Uh( eCi0` ). Hence eσi0h` = 0 follows from Uh(Ci0` ) <
Uh( eCi0` ) ≤ Uh( eCi0h ) = Uh( eCi1h ).
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Case 1′.2: σi0hh = 0 and N
i0 > 0 for some i0 ∈ {1, ..., n}.
In that case we have σi0h` = σ
i0
`` = N
i0 and σ̂i0h` = σ̂
i0
`` = 1. The optimal solution to
P2(λ, c, U eh, 0) is thus a pooling allocation where both types choose C˜
i0
` . Propositions 1
and 2 that this is possible only when U eh = u(WN − piA) and C˜i0` = (piA,A− piA). Let
Ci0h , close to C˜
i0
` , such that U`(C
i0
h ) > U`(C˜
i0
` ) and λΠh(C
i0
h ) + (1− λ)Π`(Ci0h ) > 0. Let
Ci0` = (0, 0). We obtain a contradiction since
Π˜i0 = λσ˜i0hhΠh(C
i0
h ) + (1− λ)Π`(Ci0h ) ≥ λΠh(Ci0h ) + (1− λ)Π`(Ci0h ) > 0 = Π
i0 .
Case 2′: U eh < U
∗
h .
Assume in addition that the equilibrium satisfies SDS. When U eh < U
∗
h , we know
from Propositions 1, 2 and 4 that C˜ih = (pihA, (1 − pih)A) with pih > pih such that
u(W−pihA) = U eh, for all i such that σihh > 0. Let i0 such that N
i0 > 0 and suppose that
there exists i1 6= i0 such that σi1hh > 0. Let Ci0h = (pi′hA, (1 − pi′h)A) with pih < pi′h < pih
and Ci0` = C˜
i0
` . For all i 6= i0, we have Uh(Ci0h ) > Uh(C˜ih) and thus σ˜ihh = 0. Hence
σ˜i0hh = 1 −
∑n
i=1 σ˜
i
h`. SDS gives σ˜
i
`` = σ
i
`` for all i. Furthermore THP and Lemma 3
imply x˜i` > c if p
i > 0. Hence we have σ˜ih` = σ
i
h` if p
i > 0 from Lemma 8. Furthermore
when pi = 0 we have Uh(C˜i`) ≤ U
e and thus Uh(C˜i`) < Uh(C
i0
h ), which gives σ˜
i
h` = 0.
Hence, σ˜ih` ≤ σih` for all i. Consequently
σi0hh = 1−
n∑
i=1
σih` −
∑
i6=i0
σihh ≤ 1−
n∑
i=1
σ˜ih` −
∑
i6=i0
σihh.
Hence σ˜i0hh ≥ σi0hh +
∑
i6=i0 σ
i
hh > σ
i0
hh. We have
Πi0 = λ[σi0hhΠh(C˜
i0
h ) + σ
i0
h`Πh(C˜
i0
` )] + (1− λ)σi0``Π`(C˜i0` ).
We have Πh(C˜i0h ) > 0 if σ
i0
hh > 0 from U
e
h < U
∗
h and we also have Πh(C
i0
h ) > 0. Since
Πh(C˜i0` ) < Π`(C˜
i0
` ) and Π
i0 = 0, we deduce Πh(C˜i0` ) < 0 if σ
i0
h` > 0. Hence
Πi0 ≤ λ[(σ˜i0hh −
∑
i6=i0
σihh)Πh(C
i0
h ) + σ˜
i0
h`Πh(C
i0
` )] + (1− λ)σ˜i0``Π`(Ci0` ) < Π˜i0 ,
for pih−pi′h small enough, hence a contradiction. If σihh = 0 for all i 6= i0, we may consider
a similar deviation by any insurer i 6= i0 leading to the same kind of contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 6
Let E be a separating equilibrium that satisfies THP and SDS. Propositions 4 and 5
yield the characterization of the equilibrium allocation given in Proposition 6. They also
show that U`(C∗∗` ) = Φ2(λ, c, U
∗
h , 0) is a necessary condition for a separating equilibrium
to exist. Let us show that it is also a sufficient condition. Hence assume U`(C∗∗` ) =
Φ2(λ, c, U∗h , 0) and let C˜, p, σh, σ` be defined as in Proposition 6, with N
i = 1/n, λi = λ
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and µi ≡ µ˜i(C˜) = 0 for all i. Equations (3) to (6) are satisfied for C = C˜. Insurers and
insureds play mixed strategy in the continuation subgame following C and consequently
for all C 6= C˜, p˜(C), σ˜h(C), σ˜`(C), µ˜(C) can be chosen in such a way that (3),(4), (5)
and (7) are satisfied, i.e. it is a continuation equilibrium. We have to show that for all
Ci 6= C˜i and all i, p˜ ≡ p˜(Ci, C˜−i), σ˜h ≡ σ˜h(Ci, C˜−i), σ˜` ≡ σ˜`(Ci, C˜−i), µ˜i ≡ µ˜i(Ci, C˜−i)
can be chosen such that equation (6) is also satisfied. Let Π˜i be the RHS in (6). The
LHS is Πi = 0 and thus (6) is written as Π˜i ≤ 0. Note that at any continuation
equilibrium following the deviation by insurer i, we have σ˜ihhΠh(C
i
h) + σ˜
i
h`Π`(C
i
`) ≤ 0
because σ˜ihk = 0 if Uh(C
i
k) < U
∗
h for k = h, `.
If max{U`(Cih), U`(Ci`)} ≤ U`(C∗∗` ), we may choose the continuation equilibrium such
that σ˜i`h + σ˜
i
`` = 0 which implies Π˜
i ≤ 0.
If max{U`(Cih), U`(Ci`)} > U`(C∗∗` ), let σ˜i`h and σ˜i`` in [0, 1] such that σ˜i`h + σ˜i`` = 1
and σ˜i`hU`(C
i
h)+ σ˜
i
``U`(C
i
`) = max{U`(Cih), U`(Ci`)}. If σ˜i`hΠ`(Cih)+ σ˜i``Π`(Ci`) ≤ 0, then
Π˜i ≤ 0. If σ˜i`hΠ`(Cih) + σ˜i``Π`(Ci`) > 0 (which is assumed in what follows), we have
max{Uh(Cih), Uh(Ci`)} > U∗h . Consider the two following cases.
Case 1: Uh(Cih) ≥ U∗h . If Uh(Ci`) > Uh(Cih), xi` > c and K(xi`, λ, c)σ˜i`` ≤ 1, let
p˜i ∈ [0, 1] such that Uh`(Ci`, p˜i) = Uh(Cih), σ˜ih` = K(xi`, λ, c)σ˜i``, σ˜ihh = 1−σ˜ih`. Otherwise,
let p˜i = 0 and let σ˜ih` and σ˜
i
hh such that σ˜
i
h` + σ˜
i
hh = 1, σ˜
i
hhUh(C
i
h) + σ˜
i
h`Uh(C
i
`) =
max{Uh(Cih), Uh(Ci`)}. Let also µ˜i given by (7) and σ˜i
′
jk = 0, p˜
i
′
= 0, µ˜i
′
= 1 for all
i′ 6= i and (j, k) ∈ {h, `}2. This is a continuation equilibrium, i.e. (3),(4), (5) and (7)
are satisfied. Furthermore A ≡ {Ch = Cih, C` = Ci`, p̂ = p˜i, σ̂hh = σ˜ihh, σ̂h` = σ˜ih`, σ̂`h =
σ˜i`h, σ̂`` = σ˜
i
``} satisfies conditions (20) to (25). If (19) also holds, then A is feasible
in P2(λ, c, U∗h , 0) and thus max{U`(Cih), U`(Ci`)} ≤ Φ2(λ, c, U∗h , 0) = U`(C∗∗` ), hence a
contradiction. (19) thus does not hold, which gives Π˜i < 0.
Case 2: Uh(Cih) < U
∗
h . In that case, we necessary have Uh(C
i
`)} > U∗h . If xi` > c
and K(xi`, λ, c)σ˜
i
`` ≤ 1 (Case 2.1), let p˜i ∈ (0, 1] such that Uh`(Ci`, p˜i) = U∗h , σ˜ih` =
K(xi`, λ, c)σ˜
i
``, σ˜
i
hh = 0. Otherwise (Case 2.2), let p˜
i = 0, σ˜ih` = 1, σ˜
i
hh = 0. Let also µ˜
i
given by (7), and σ˜i
′
hh = (1 − σ˜ih`)/(n − 1), σ˜i
′
j` = 0, p˜
i
′
= 0, µ˜i
′
= 1 for all i′ 6= i and
j ∈ {h, `}. This is a continuation equilibrium and A (defined as in Case 1) satisfies (20)
to (25). In Case 2.1, if (19) also holds, then A is feasible in P4(λ˜i, c, U∗h , 0) where λ˜i =
σ˜i``cpi`/[σ˜
i
``cpi` + pih(x
i
` − c)] ∈ (0, 1) and thus max{U`(Cih), U`(Ci`)} ≤ Φ4(λ˜i, c, U∗h , 0) =
Φ4(λ, c, U∗h , 0) ≤ Φ2(λ, c, U∗h , 0) = U`(C∗∗` ), hence the same contradiction as in Case 1,
which gives Π˜i < 0. In Case 2.2, if (19) also holds, then A is feasible in P3(λ, c, U∗h , 0),
which also leads to Π˜i < 0.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proposition 7 can be proved in almost the same way as Proposition 6. Propositions
4 and 5 provide the characterization of a semi-separating equilibrium and they show
that U`(Ĉ`) = Φ2(λ, c, U∗h , 0) is a necessary condition for a semi-separating equilibrium
to exist. The same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 7 (by substituting Ĉ` to
44
C∗∗` ) shows that it is also a sufficient condition.
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